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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT,
RELATED LEGAL ISSUES, AND GLOBAL COMPARISONS
JOHN M. HOLCOMB
"I don't sense an enthusiastic pursuit of the fundamental principles of corporate
governance even today. I see a reluctant minimalist approach, staying one
step ahead of the regulators more than anything else. I am trying to find my
own way in getting a stronger board and stronger shareholder involvement on the
issues. If you re not utterly insensitive to matters, you have to a ree that
shareholders are getting more active and restless. 
They want more say.
When even a leading corporate CEO such as Andrew Grove is skeptical of the
system of corporate governance in place today at most corporations, there is a real
problem. Many of the corporate scandals of the past two years come back to the
deficiencies in corporate governance. At Enron and other companies, the focus
was on the failure of the audit committee of the board of directors. At Tyco and
WorldCom, the focus was on the willingness of the board to approve lavish loans
and compensation for the CEO and other top officers. At other companies, the
focus has been on both the structure and composition of the board, and particularly
on its lack of independence. We should remember, however, that in terms of
independence, some consider the Enron board to have been a model board of
directors.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
Reform of corporate governance is not a new issue. It is now simply a more
compelling and urgent issue, perhaps because adequate responses were not
forthcoming earlier. Ever since the 1970s, there has been a concern about the
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1. Patrick McGeehan, Can Annual Meetings Restore Trust? N.Y TIMES, May 11, 2003, at 3.1
(quoting Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of Intel).
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independence of the board. Irving Shapiro, then CEO of DuPont, was one of the
leading spokespersons for greater board independence and for an infusion of
independent outside directors. Diversity on the board became an issue as well in
the 1970s, partially in response to the civil rights era and to issues of minority and
women's rights. These were modest suggestions at the time, in contrast to Ralph
Nader's more aggressive call for federal chartenng of corporations. In the 1976
book Taming the Giant Corporation, he and Joel Seligman criticized the lenient
governance standards imposed on corporations through the state chartering
mechanism, especially for those major companies chartered in the state of
Delaware.2 They proposed instead that corporations be chartered by the federal
government and that every corporation with over $700 million in assets have a
board of nine members, representing various corporate constituents, including
workers, consumers, suppliers, environmental advocates, and community
members.3
That proposal strikes at the heart of the ongoing debate over corporate
governance - to whom should corporations be ultimately accountable, shareholders
or stakeholders? The classical corporate model or ownership model would answer
"shareholders." 4 The more modern theory would answer "stakeholders." 5 Some
claim that is more consistent with the managerial model of most large
corporations, though others claim the managerial model has degenerated into a
form that elevates managerial self-interest and executive ego over the interests of
any stakeholders.6 The separation of ownership and management characteristic of
the large modern enterprise analyzed by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means in the
classic work The American Corporation and a large body of literature on the issue,
has spawned a governance trap.7 With no real consensus on the accountability
2. See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976).
3. Id., See also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
574 (1984) (containing a sympathetic discussion of this proposal).
4. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, in ETHICAL
THEORY AND BUSINESS (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001).
5. R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY
AND BUSINESS (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001) (leading work on
stakeholder theory or the stakeholder approach); see also MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL. RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995) (setting
forth an approach that blends accountability to stakeholders with the fiduciary duty to shareholders);
See also J.A. CONGER, ET AL, CORPORATE BOARDS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR ADDING VALUE AT THE TOP
CH. 9 (2001); STEVEN WALKER & JEFFERY MARR. STAKEHOLDER POWER: A WINNING PLAN FOR
BUILDING STAKEHOLDER COMMITMENT AND DRIVING CORPORATE GROWTH 2001 (an example of
modem executives have also largely embraced the stakeholder approach).
6. See generally KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 317-46 (2002) (detailing a
historical and political perspective on executive abuses). See also Jack Bogle, What Went Wrong in
Corporate America, Community Forum Distinguished Speaker Series (February 25, 2003), transcript
available at http:www.vanguard.com/bogle site/sp20030224.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (Jack
Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, and Peter Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce and co-chair
of the Commission on Public Trust of the Conference Board, have spoken widely before many pubic
forums and in congressional testimony about executive greed and abuses.). For historical and political
perspective on executive abuses, see KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY- A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH, CH. 8 2002.
7 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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model of the corporation, there is much confusion and disagreement over just how
it should be governed.
The need for a committee structure on the board became a prominent issue in
the 1970s as well.8 With the scandal over inappropriate payments to foreign
government officials in the early 1970s and the subsequent passage of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 the requirement that corporate boards have an audit
committee became a legal requirement. 9 Corporate public policy or public
responsibility committees became more common among Fortune 500 companies at
the time as well.' 0 In response to a shareholder resolution that Ralph Nader filed
against General Motors as part of his Campaign GM, requesting that the company
form such committee, the company did so." A few years thereafter, a survey by
the Conference Board found that over a hundred companies had formed such board
committees.12
Beyond audit and public policy committees, the gradual formation of
nominating and compensation committees also followed over time. Nominating
committees were a response to the need to both diversify boards and to identify
outside directors not beholden to CEOs. 13 Compensation committees were a
response to the need for a check and independent voice on decisions over
executive compensation, and they have assumed an even larger significance with
the rising controversy over CEO compensation. 14 The latter issue is examined in
another section of this article, but it is inextricably tied to the issue of corporate
governance. In fact, some see it as the major unresolved issue of corporate
accountability and credibility, even with the Sarbanes-Oxley law and other recent
reforms.' 5 In terms of public perception and corporate image, it leaves a more
indelible impression on the public than any other issue. It also goes beyond
corporate accountability and is symbolic of the issue of social justice that heavily
PROPERTY 4 (1932).
8. Michael L. Lovdal, Making the Audit Committee Work, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1977, at
108, 108-9. (There has been growing recognition of the importance of board committees for large
corporations over time.). See also The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, May
2002, at 14, available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004)
(The Business Roundtable has stated that it believes that the functions generally performed by the
audit, compensation and corporate governance committees are central to effective corporate
governance.").
9. RICHARD SCHAFFER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 503
(2002).
10. Michael L. Lovdal et al., Public Responsibility Committees of the Board, HARV Bus. REV
May-June 1977, at 40, 40-41.
11. JOHN H. JACKSON, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY' MANAGING SOCIAL ISSUES 370 (1997).
12. PHYLLIS MCGRATH, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: THE PUBLIC POLICY
COMMITTEE. RESEARCH REPORT NO. 775 (1980).
13. Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2002, at
106, 113.
14. Id. at 109 (citing a 2001 study from the National Association of Corporate Directors and
Institutional Shareholder Services of 5,000 public company boards showing that 99 percent have audit
committees and 91 percent have compensation committees).
15. Treasury Snow Says Corporate Reform Includes Executives Pay, Oct. 16, 2003, at 2, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Jan/O6-631299.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
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resonates with a large portion of the public.
Duties of Directors
Beyond the structure and composition of the board, the legal duties of the
directors have also become more stringent over time. Historically good-faith
errors in judgment by board members enjoyed the defense of the business
judgment rule, a rather permissive rule that prompted a court to defer to business
judgment rather than substitute its own. The Delaware Chancery Court issued
many decisions providing for a wide expanse of managerial prerogative. 16 Over
time, however, even the Delaware courts have begun to demand more in the way
of due care and diligence, informed decision-making, and independent judgment
by corporate directors, through such decisions as Smith v. Van Gorkum.1
7
Regarding board member independence, there is one major point of legal
vulnerability for many current board members and that is potential conflicts of
interest they might have as insiders or quasi-insiders.
Board-Management Relations
In the midst of rising concerns over CEO compensation and with the greater
role now being played by outside directors, evidence exists that boards are being
tougher m holding CEOs accountable. 18 In their annual survey of CEO turnover,
Booz Allen Hamilton experts have found that performance-related turnover
reached a record high in 2 0 0 2 .19 It constituted 39 percent of all CEO successions,
including those who voluntarily retired and merger-related turnovers. 20 The
highest rates of performance-related turnover were in the information technology
telecommunications services, and consumer discretionary industries. 21 The most
impressive finding is that the "return gap" - the difference in the total shareholder
return between a company's return and the total market return for voluntarily
retired and fired CEOs - declined to 6.2 in 2002 from 13.5 in 2000 and 11.9 in
2001.22 This demonstrates that boards are now judging CEOs more harshly and
that forced dismissals took place for underperformance that earlier would have
been tolerated.
Despite the renewed assertiveness of some boards, the examples of recent
board failures are many Most often, those failures have been due to inattention
16. This phenomenon is what. many critics have labeled the "race to the bottom" in terms of
attracting corporations and generating chartenng fees by conditions friendly to management; a race that
Delaware seems to have won.
17 Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73, 893 (1985).
18. Patrick McGeehan, Study Finds Number of Chiefs Forced to Leave Jobs Is Up, N.Y TiMES,
May 12, 2003, at C2.
19 Chuck Lucier, et aL., CEO Succession 2002: Deliver or Depart, STRATEGY + BUSINESS,
Summer 2003, at 1-2, available at http://www.strategy-business.com/press/artcle/21700?pg=O (last
visited Feb. 28, 2004).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 8-11.
22. Id. at 8.
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rather than lack of independence, although there is sometimes a mixture of the two.
The Freddie Mac case is an instructive one.23 A series of interviews related to the
Freddie Mac accounting issues "shows a board whose members struggled, and
sometimes hesitated, to take tough action against top executives they had known
and respected for years."24 The board's audit committee finally hired former SEC
General Counsel James Doty to conduct an investigation, later broadening that
investigation and requesting a report to the full board. 25  The firm's auditor,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), refused to accept representations from Freddie
Mac's president and chief operating officer, and Doty found pages deleted from
the COO's diary that may have shown his direct involvement in the accounting
problems related to over one trillion dollars of denvatives and an effort to hide
fluctuating earnings and create an impression of smooth earnings growth over
time.26 The board, initially wanting the COO to resign, only then decided it must
fire him, and forced out the CEO and chief financial officer as well. While
Doty's report "largely absolves the board, saying that management withheld key
information from the board, other finance experts believe the report is too soft on
the board, that the board "should have been more aggressive, asked more questions
and relied less on what officials were telling them." 2 The Economist found the
following as key features of the Freddie Mac crisis: "missing documents; lavish
executive pay- uncooperative directors; and indications that Freddie Mac's
reported figures are wrong, and its internal controls are in chaos. 29
Subsequent to forcing out the three top officers, the board then promoted the
chief investment officer to be president and CEO.30 However, the Doty report
directly implicates him as well in circumventing new denvatives accounting rules
and even in dividing the denvatives transactions so they would not have to be
disclosed to the board. One business reporter therefore concludes, "Restonng
Freddie's credibility ought to mean getting nd of everybody involved - up to and
including the board of directors,' 31 The Doty report found that the tone of the
organization and goal of attaining smooth reporting earnings for "steady Freddie"
was set at the top.32 Another report concludes:
The convoluted strategies Freddie Mac employed ultimately failed, contributing to
as much as $4.5 billion in accounting errors [and] provide some of the most
vivid illustrations since the collapse of Enron Corporation of the lengths to which
corporations have gone to circumvent accounting rules and manipulate the





27. Id., Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Told to Remove CEO, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2003, at El.
28. Kathleen Day, Report Faults Freddie Mac Officials, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at El.
29. Trouble at Home, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2003, at 70.
30. Day, supra note 28.
31. Jerry Knight, At Freddie Mac, It's Hard to Lay Claim to Innocence, WASH. POST, July 28,
2003, at El.
32. See Day, supra note 28.
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numbers they disclose to the investing public.
33
Outside or Independent Directors
The debate over corporate governance has emphasized, and some would
argue has overemphasized, the importance of companies having outside or
independent directors on the board. That was emphasized by early reformers and
is a key component of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions and the NYSE standards,
requiring that key board committees be composed entirely of outsiders.34
Outsiders, and especially genuinely independent directors, are ostensibly less
prone to defer to the CEO and may bring broader perspectives to board
deliberations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that outside directors are also
becoming more actively engaged in corporate decision-making." One study found
that when such outsiders serve on a network of multiple boards, they may diffuse
positive standards of CEO compensation and of useful strategic lessons among
several firms.3 6
Beyond the legal duties of directors, the powers of the board include those of
both monitoring the behavior of management and more actively contributing to
strategic policy-making. Both require a certain detachment from management and
independence from management influence. 37 Hence, a great debate has ensued
over the need to have more outside or independent directors on the board. If a
director has business or personal ties to corporate management, he or she might too
easily be influenced into rubber-stamping management decisions. The control
exerted by management over directors and the "cozy" relationship between the two
is the most common criticism of corporate governance. The criteria for
determining a genuinely "independent" director is of course subject to debate, and
to be independent does not guarantee a board member will be actively engaged in
his or her board responsibilities.
Both the regulators and the academic literature favor independent rather than
inside directors. The academic literature does so because it is based on agency
theory, which sees the key role of boards as being the control or monitoring
function.38 It is reasonable that independent directors, less related and beholden to
the CEO, would be more effective monitors. However, a competing theory, that of
33. David S. Hilzenrath, Strategy Aimed to Circumvent New Rule, WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at
El.
34. Lovdal, supra note 8, at 108-9.
35. Carrie Johnson, Corporate Audit Panels to Gain Power, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at E2
(citing Charles M. Elson, director of the Center for Corporate Governance at the University of
Delaware, who has noticed audit committees are meeting more often and seeking more outside advice
since the collapse of Enron).
36. James D. Westphal, et al., Second-order Imitation: Uncovering Latent Effects of Board
Network Ties, ADMIN. Sci. Q., Dec. 2001, at 717
37. See CONGER, supra note 5, ch. 2; Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at i II (stressing that a culture of
open dissent within the board is even more important than dominance by outside directors).
38. Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating
Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 383, 383-84 (2003).
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resource dependency, suggests that the board provides much more than a control
function and that it also provides a wide range of resources or capital to the
corporation beneficial to business and strategic decisions. 39 Based on this theory
dependent directors from the firm's customers, suppliers, consultants, or bankers
might actually have a greater incentive to supply "board capital" since they would
stand to gain more from the contribution than would completely detached
outsiders.40  Based on this analysis, the firm would gain more from a board
composed of both dependent and independent directors, rather than one dominated
by independent directors. However, the dependent directors need not be corporate
insiders in the strictest sense of that term, i.e., employees of the firm. It is not
necessary that they actually be on the board for the directors to gain from their
insights and input. Outside directors should be able to question key insiders at
anytime for relevant information and some companies are even structuring such
interaction to ensure that directors are informed of new developments within the
firm.
41
This may also explain why a meta-analysis of all studies on the link between
board composition and financial performance4 2 found there is no positive
correlation between firm financial performance and a large proportion of outsiders
on a corporate board.43 Further, both Enron and Tyco had boards with a heavy
presence of outside directors and might be considered model boards, yet they
failed in dramatic fashion. 44 Hence, the culture of firm and the board, along with
other best board practices, may be more important than the presence of outsiders
on the board, as required or promoted by Sarbanes-Oxley and the standards of the
stock exchanges.45
The life cycle and tenure of the CEO, and even of the firm, may further
complicate the value of dependent and independent directors at any given point in
time. One study argues that early in a CEO's tenure, especially one hired from
outside the firm, the board must play a greater role in leadership development than
in monitoring opportunistic behavior.46 Cultivating leadership might call for a
combination of backgrounds and skills from both independent and dependent
directors.
Separation of Chairman and CEO
The separation of the positions of chairman and CEO is seen by some experts
39. Id. at 385-388.
40. Id. at 391.
41. Saul Gellerman, Why Corporations Can't Control Chicanery, 46 Bus. HORIZONS 3, 17-24
(2003).
42. Dan R. Dalton, et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure,
and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 269-70 (1998).
43. Id. at 280.
44. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 108.
45. /d. atl 109-113.
46. Wei Shen, The Dynamics of the CEO-Board Relationship: An Evolutionary Perspective, 28
ACAD. MGMT. REV 466,466-67 (2003).
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as even more important than dominance by independent directors on the board, but
it is an area where little progress has been made by U.S. corporations. According
to a study by The Corporate Library, only fifteen of S&P 500 corporations have an
47independent director as chairman. More common has been a compromise
measure of selecting a lead outside director to preside over board meetings even
when the CEO is chairman.48
Best Board Practices
Along with new actors and new aspects of shareholder activism, there is also
an evolving discussion and study of "best practices" in corporate governance. That
list has expanded from the traditional list of director independence and committee
49structures. Various advocates are now emphasizing such new board practices as:
Separation of Chairman and CEO Positions;
Lead Director Position;
Totality of Independent Directors (as at Amencan Standard, Baxter
Healthcare, and Fortune Brands);
Limits on Number of Multiple Directors (numbers of board seats held);
Downsizing of Boards (Crandall, former CEO of AMR recommends six
to eight members and no committees);
Board Meetings without Management
More Frequent Meetings and Staff Support;
Frequent and Complete Disclosure of Information to the Board;
Stock Ownership by Board Members, but no options;
Evaluations of Corporate Governance Process;
Board Committee on Corporate Governance; and,
Limit CEOs and Directors on Each Other's Boards
50
Whatever measures are taken voluntarily or mandated by the SEC, some
advocates contend that they all fall short. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Associate Dean of
the Yale School of Organization and Management, claims it all comes down to
corporate culture. 5' There must be a culture of independence on the board, in
substance and not just in form. Independent directors must be inquisitive and
challenging, and dissent must be respected and encouraged by senior management
for genuine checks and balances to exist. Independent directors of stature,
47 Ben White, Save the Chairfor the Chief? WASH. POST., Feb. 7, 2003, at El; see also The
Corporate Library, Exclusive Special Report on CEO/Chairman Splits in the S&P 500: How Many and
How Independent? Feb. 2003, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/study/spotlight.asp (last visited
Feb. 29, 2004) (containing multiple corporate studies).
48. Paul Kocourek, et. ai., Corporate Governance: Hard Facts About Soft Behaviors, STRATEGY +
BUsiNESS, Spring 2003, at I, available at http://www.strategy-business.com/press/article/8322?pg=0
(last visited Jan. 30, 2004); Mary Williams Walsh & David Leonhardt, To Rein in Abuses, Executives
Get Watchdogs, N.Y TiMES, July 5, 2002, at CI.
49. See Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 106-109 (detailing traditional board structures); Nell
Minnow, Stockholders Would Benefit From More Board Flexibility, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at
13A (detailing emerging board best practices).
50. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 112-13; Minnow, supra note 49.
51. Sonnenfeld, supra note 13, at 109.
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expertise, and standing must be appointed.52
In keeping with Sonnenfeld's views, others have also suggested that
qualitative reforms going well beyond the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley may do
much more to improve corporate governance.53 Kocourek, Burger, and Birchard
emphasize the following key ingredients: (1) Select the right directors: one study
by Korn/Ferry found that current directors rate "willingness to challenge
management" as the number one criteria for a good director;54 (2) Training of
directors: a major failing of most corporations, but Pfizer is an example of a
company that does an excellent job; (3) Inform and empower directors: they need a
constant flow of information, ready access to key managers, and both financial and
nonfinancial measures of company progress; (4) Counterbalance the CEO:
separating the positions of chairman and CEO is necessary and far better than just
having a lead director, and the board nominating committee must have more power
than the CEO in selecting future directors; (5) Nurture a culture of collegial
questioning: while being a partner with the CEO, strong-willed directors must also
challenge and disagree; (6) Devote an adequate amount of time: directors must
devote 100-200 hours a year to a board, and perhaps 300 hours for audit committee
members; 55 (7) Measure board performance: studies show a small percentage of
boards face up to this need, but surveyed directors recognize its value.
56
Continuing with the emphasis on director diligence, as opposed to
independence, another author suggests ways of increasing the time invested by
directors and expanding their control. One argues in favor of full-time directors,
who view that job as their primary responsibility and serve on only one corporate
board.57 Such directors would also be given "the authonty of a military inspector-
general, with the right to question anyone within the company and impose
sanctions on them.
58
Finally, for corporate governance to really work, cooperation must exist
between the corporate community and business policy organizations on the one
hand and self-regulatory bodies and government regulators on the other. Each
must respect the professionalism of the other. The adversary spirit long dominant
between business and regulators will impede progress on the road to reform. All
must march together in the same direction.
Shareholder Rights
In the 1970s, much of the incipient changes in corporate governance related to
the structure and composition of the corporate board.59 However, there also was
52. Id. at 113
53. Kocourek, supra note 48, at 12.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 4-5.
57 Gellerman, supra note 41.
58. Id.
59. Lovdal, supra note 8, at 108-10; JACKSON, supra note II, at 367-370.
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movement in the area of shareholder rights and powers as well. Shareholders have
historically enjoyed and used the following legal powers:
Voting - to vote for or against directors, usually a management slate of
directors, as well as to vote on proxy resolutions. There has also been a
modest campaign for the system of cumulative voting, which would give
dissident directors more concentrated power in electing some
representatives to the board.
Inspecting the Books - beyond having access to the 10-K report and other
corporate disclosures, shareholders sometimes legally demand and receive
access to more detailed financial information, under special circumstances
and when it is in their material interests.
Lawsuits - shareholders can bring individual, class action, or denvate
suits against management when they have been injured by management
mistakes.
Wall Street Rule - the final power by shareholders has been that of
exiting or selling their shares when they disagree with the direction of the
company and decisions of management.
Shareholder Resolutions - they can file a resolution on a corporate policy
with which they disagree, to be voted upon by all shareholders, when they
own $2,000 worth of stock.60
It is the final power of introducing shareholder resolutions that has become
ever more prominent since the 1970s. The SEC has periodically ruled on the
criteria that such resolutions should meet, which can be disqualified by
management, and the votes required for resubmission of such resolutions.6i
Organized shareholders, though, have been the driving force behind what has
really become a movement of shareholder resolutions. The radical organizer Saul
Alinsky used resolutions as an organizing strategy in the 1950s;62 Nader later used
them for a time in the late 1960s;63 and the National Council of Churches really
promoted their widespread use since that time. 64 Its Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility annually sponsors hundreds of shareholder resolutions.65 Other
religious and labor organizations now sponsor resolutions as well.
66
As an indication of their growing impact, the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) formed in 1973 to monitor shareholder resolutions and to
advise institutional investors on how to vote their shares.67 Most of the resolutions
60. ARTHUR LEviTT, TAKE ON THE STREET 211-212 (2002).
61. Security Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a)(8), 17 CFR 1.
62. SANDOR D. HORwITT, LET THEM CALL ME REBEL. SAUL ALINSKY, His LIFE AND LEGACY
(1989).
63. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 370.
64. Id.
65. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Companies, Resolutions and Status: 2002-2003
Season, at http://www.iccr.org/shareholder/proxybook03/03statuschart.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2004)
(listing continual update on these resolutions); The Corporate Library, News Briefs, at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/news/default.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (featuring articles on
shareholder activism).
66. The Corporate Library, News Briefs, supra note 65.
67 The Investor Responsibility Research Center Library, at
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of the 1970s and 1980s related to the social impact of corporate policies, such as
disclosure of EEO data, investment in South Africa, development of nuclear
power, or animal testing.6s Reflecting current times, shareholder resolutions more
commonly focus today on mainstream corporate governance issues, such as the
separation of the office of CEO and chairman of the board, the demand for more
independent directors, or reform of CEO compensation.69
NEW ELEMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In terms of what is new in shareholder activism, the upsurge in activism by
mainstream shareholders on mainstream issues tells the tale. No longer are liberal
church groups and other cause organizations the only ones sponsoring resolutions
on largely social issues. Even before the wave of corporate scandals, corporate
governance had become a growing concern among institutional investors. Beyond
the formation of the IRRC in 1973, other organizations formed to assist
institutional investors in the 1980s, including Institutional Shareholder Services,
Inc.7° James E. Heard, an organizer of IRRC, is now a principal in this firm.7' In
fact, boards and senior management might have seen the earlier activism on
corporate governance as an early-warning signal to its importance as an issue.
Regulators might likewise have paid closer attention.
Now, in the wake of the scandals over management and board misconduct,
other organized interests have entered the arena. The Council of Institutional
Investors, along with state pension funds, is playing a greater role in pressunng
management and boards on corporate governance and executive pay issues.7 2 The
rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, are now involved in
evaluating the governance mechanisms and systems of the companies they
http://www.irrc.org/resources/iibrary.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (providing some of IRRC's
research which is known as fair and objective).
68. See DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS
AUTHORITY 69-125 (1978); see also PATRICIA O'TOOLE, MONEY & MORALS IN AMERICA 300-27
(1998).
69. Robert D. Hershey, Investor Angst Prompts Funds to Speak Up, N.Y TIMES, July 7 2002, at
3.5; see also The Corporate Library, Shareholder Proposals, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/
shareholder-action/shareprops/default.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (containing submitted shareholder
proposals); CaIPERS, Shareholder Action, at http://www.calpers-govemance.org/alert/default.asp (last
visited Feb. 14, 2004) (detailing CaPERS' policies on exercising its voting rights); TIAA-CREF
TIAA-CREF Publications, at https://www5.tiaa-cref.org/bookstore/list.do?cat-6 (last visited Feb. 14,
2004) (containing TIAA-CREF's investment philosophies); AFL-CIO, Executive PayWatch, at
http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch (last visited Feb. 14, 2004) (covering executive compensation trends,
issues, and resolutions).
70. Institutional Shareholder Services, Company Profile (2004), at
http://www.issproxy.comlabout/index.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), Inc. is a for-profit proxy monitoring service.). For a critique of ISS's potential conflicts of
interest, see Adam Lishinsky, ISS Wants Business Both Ways, FORTUNE, June 16, 2003, at 24.
71. Institutional Shareholder Services, Company Profile, supra note 70 (information about staff
and operations).
72. See Council of Institutional Investors, What We Do, at http://www.cii.org/dcwascii/web.nsf/
doc/whatindex.cm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) (information on its corporate governance activities).
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evaluate.73 Finally, there are new companies that have been recently formed to sell
services on corporate governance evaluation, such as Governance Metrics
International.74 Investors are beginning to focus much more on governance
evaluation, partially because studies increasingly show a positive relationship
between "good governance" and financial performance.75 That field of study will
likely grow even more as the corporate governance issue remains high on the
agenda.
Organized political interests have also taken positions on corporate
governance. The Business Roundtable has promoted the need for more
independent boards, even while it takes a cautious stance on the expensing of stock
options.76 The Conference Board formed a Commission on Public Trust and
Private Enterprise, co-chaired by former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson and
John Biggs of TIAA-CREF 77 and it has stressed the need for more scrutiny and
independence on corporate boards, as well as the expensing of stock options.78
John Bogle, a member of the Commission and founder of the Vanguard
Group, has emerged as a leading activist in favor of corporate governance
reform. 79  He has been a critic of both the gatekeepers and monitors, such as
corporate boards, regulators, and legislators, as well as of investors themselves.
He believes the mutual funds must step to the plate in monitoring the governance
of companies in which they invest. As he puts it:
Even after the bear market that devastated the value of our clients' equity
holdings, the only response we've heard from the mutual fund industry is the
sound of silence. We need to return to behaving as owners rather than traders,
to return to pnnciples of prudence and trusteeship rather than of speculation and
salesmanship, and to return to acting as good stewards of the assets entrusted to
80our care.
73. See Standard & Poor's, Governance Services, at http://www.standardandpoors.com (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
74. See Governance Metrics International, About Us: Overview, at http://www.gmiratings.com
(last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
75. See Jeanne Patterson, The Patterson Report: Corporate Governance and Corporate
Performance Research (2003), available at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/Govemance-
Research/patterson-report/patterson.asp (last visited Mar. I1, 2004). See also The Corporate Library,
Governance Research (2004) (containing multiple studies), at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/Govemance-Research/default.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
76. The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance, (May, 2002) at http:/www.
businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
77 The Commission on Public Trust and Enterprise, (2004), at http://www.conference
board.org/knowledge/govemCommission.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (Co-chair Biggs was an
erstwhile candidate to head the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, established by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while Harvey Pitt was still Chairman of the SEC, but his candidacy met with
substantial business opposition.).
78. The Commission Board, Commission on Public Trust & Private Enterprise: Findings &
Recommendations, Jan. 9. 2003, at 38-39, at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/758.pdf (last
visited Mar. 2, 2004).




One other major issue is of renewed concern for shareholders, that of
transparency Disclosures of all sorts of corporate practices related to the
governance system, to accounting, and to the means of evaluating executive
performance and compensation are being promoted by shareholders. The SEC has
unanimously proposed a rule requiring greater disclosure on how corporate
directors are selected, including policies on how directors are nominated, the
minimum qualifications to serve on the board and how candidates came to the
attention of the board.8
Shareholder Nomination of Directors
Historically, shareholders have had limited powers in nominating directors
due to management's control of the proxy machinery Shareholders' ability to
nominate directors and participate in board elections has been undermined by the
huge financial barriers of financing a campaign for their own nominees.
Corporations enjoy the power to finance campaigns and proxy materials for only
those candidates nominated by the corporate board. Shareholders therefore face a
slate of choices selected by the company Outside candidates must present
shareholders with an alternative ballot at their own expense. As one business
writers concludes, "Most significant [even after Sarbanes-Oxley], the very heart of
corporate governance, the election of directors, is still a sham. The shareholder
ballots you receive with your proxy materials are just like those Stalin used to
distribute. For every position there is exactly one candidate. Please mark your
choice."82
However, the SEC is now considenng a rule which would allow significant
and long-time shareholders, those with more than 3 to 5 percent of corporate
ownership, to nominate their own directors.8 3 Shareholder activist Evelyn Y Davis
and corporate governance expert Charles Elson are concerned that such a high
threshold might set a precedent for elevating the share holding requirement to
sponsor shareholder resolutions from the current level of one percent or $2,000 of
shares, but the SEC has defeated such moves in the past.84 The rule may allow
shareholder nominations when certain triggering events occur, such as a
company's failure to implement the terms of shareholder resolutions enjoying wide
support that call for changes in corporate governance, or when shareholders have
expressed widespread dissatisfaction in the current board.85 Some experts fear that
if support for shareholder resolutions becomes a triggering event, then corporations
will fight earlier and harder to heavily defeat such resolutions.
86
Another rule proposed by the SEC would require disclosure of nominating or
governance committee actions on shareholder candidates. The board would have
8i. Came Johnson, SEC Votes to Propose Director Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at E3.
82. Geoffrey Colvin, Shareholders are No Fools Anymore, FORTUNE, July 7, 2003, at 42.
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to explain why it found unacceptable a board candidate nominated by shareholders
who owned more than 3 percent ownership stake for the past year.
87
Some corporate governance reformers, such as Nell Minow and the AFL
CIO, see shareholder empowerment as bringing more fundamental change in
corporate governance than does the Sarbanes Oxley Act, through the presence of
more "outside directors" chosen by the board itself.8 8 Opponents, such as Henry
Manne, notable expert in the law and economics movement, believe that
empowering shareholders in director elections will create mischief by creating too
much corporate democracy and paralyzing corporate decision-making with the
presence on the board of activist shareholder representatives.8 9 Even moderate
critics reject the "romantic notion that corporations should be laboratories of
democracy, and conclude that "running a corporation requires more stability and
internal harmony than the democratic model allows."' 9 For these reasons, leading
business lobbies like the Business Roundtable have opposed the new rule, saying it
would "turn every director election into a divisive proxy contest." 91 The American
Society of Corporate Secretaries and the New York City Bar Association also
oppose the rule, contending it would produce divided and unqualified boards.
92
However, to this fear of a balkanized board, other governance experts reply that,
"the ideal board candidate is someone with forceful opinions who isn't afraid to
share them and that the best boards aren't necessarily those that agree, but those
that argue. 93 Some companies, like Apria Healthcare Group and Hanover
Compressor, have already allowed shareholder access to the proxy machinery to
make director nominations.94
Shareholder Litigation
Beyond the promotion of these new concerns through shareholder resolutions,
there is also a renewed emphasis on shareholder litigation. Many of the scandal-
ridden corporations have been the targets of such litigation by pensioners and
institutional investors, such as the lawsuit brought against Enron and its creditors
by the University of California system.95 Beyond the suits brought by the leading
plaintiff lawyers, such as William Lerach, many established law firms are moving
into this line of business, joined by new firms that are carving it out as a niche
business.96 Hence, any corporations and management tinged with legal problems
87. Johnson, supra note 81.
88. Minow, supra note 49.
89. Henry Manne, Citizen Donaldson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at 10.
90. Steven Pearlstein, Corporate Reform Could Go Too Far WASH. POST, July 18, 2003, at EI.
91. Louis Lavelle, Shareholder Democracy Is No Demon, BUS. WK. ONLINE, July 2, 2003, at 1, at
http://businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ju12003/nf2003072_0829db042.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2004).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Id.
95. Jerry Hirsch, UC Named Lead Plaintiff in Enron Class-Action Suit, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2002.
96. In Praise of Trial Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 60.
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can expect to confront such litigation. Just the investment banks involved in the
recent Wall Street settlement may face potential outside liability of up to $82
billion, prior to appeals and out-of-court settlements.97 Hence, the individual fines
and criminal actions, and the billions involved in the settlement, may be just the tip
of the iceberg.98
Given the requirement of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,99
that the control of such shareholder suits would rest with that largest investor,
attorneys such as William Lerach are now forced to work more closely with
institutional investors, which have the largest stakes in the litigation. In
representing the University of California against such Enron creditors as Citigroup,
J.P Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch,
Lerach's opening settlement proposal was for $15 billion.i0° He is also trying to
persuade the banks to drop their indemnification agreements, which would
increase his fees. °i As the Economist comments, "These indemnification
agreements throw liability for due-diligence failures back on the company issuing
the shares or bonds, making a nonsense of an underwriter's gatekeeping role." i02
The battle over final liability for the failures of directors and officers, and of
investment analysts in other cases, will be fought between the banks and insurance
companies. The banks will argue that D&O and E&O insurance policies should
cover their liability and even some of the money owed in the $1.4 billion
settlement orchestrated by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,10 3 while the
insurance companies will resist paying, arguing that their policies do not cover
fraud and deceit.i04 The contest relates to the larger argument over the
appropriateness of D&O indemnification policies. Some like Warren Buffet argue
that such policies create a moral hazard and encourage sloppy behavior by
directors, so Berkshire Hathaway does not even carry such policies.105 Xerox
Corporation, on the basis of its D&O policy, paid for the disgorgement of $6.4
million of gains due to fraud committed by former CEO Paul Allaire.'06 This is
but one example of what some consider the moral hazard created by such policies,
in arguing that directors and officers should, at a minimum, purchase their own
policies.' 07
Corporate Governance Ratings







103. Whose Skunk Is It? ECONOMIST, June 7, 2003, at 63-64.
i04. Id.
105. Id.
106. Carrie Johnson, Former Xerox Officials Settle Case, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at E2.
107. See Whose Skunk Is It? supra note 103.
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nsmg interest in the investment community over good governance practices,
various organizations that serve business and institutional investors have launched
corporate governance ratings services. The two major organizations that advise
institutional investors on a wide array of issues - the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) and Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) - have both
done so.' 0 8 The Corporate Library, a research organization and website directed by
Nell Minow, has also developed its own rating system, as has Governance Metrics
International, a firm developed specifically to rate corporate governance. 1' 9
Finally Standard & Poor's, a major ratings company has expanded its evaluation
of corporations and developed a Global Corporate Governance practice, headed by
George Dallas in its London office.' 10
One of the firms, ISS, has already been criticized for possible conflicts of
interest in its ratings practice."' It offers a service costing $15,000 to corporations
that helps them improve their governance ratings, while it also provides the
resulting metrics to its institutional investor clients. 12  ISS responds that it
maintains a wall of separation between its corporate and client services, but other
corporate watchdogs remain critical." 
3
While the major rating firms, such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's have
developed corporate governance ratings services, they have also been criticized for
failing to alert the investment public to the possibility of unfolding corporate
scandals, especially in the case of Enron.'i 4 A report to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector
Watchdogs criticized the rating companies for failing to probe deeply enough, for
focusing on largely short-term issues, and for failing to hold themselves
accountable for the accuracy of their reports.' 
5
Corporate Governance and Financial Performance
Many studies have examined the link between different changes in corporate
governance and financial performance, and the results have been mixed. Studies
show that the impact of more independent boards on financial performance has
been notably weak.' 16 That was the key finding of a recent study based on a large
sample of firms over an extended period of time.ii 7 Broadening the base from
independence on corporate boards to other criteria of corporate governance,
108. See Investor Responsibility Research Center Library, supra note 67" Institutional Shareholders
Services, supra note 70.
109. See Governance Metrics International, supra note 74.
110. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 73.
Ill. Adam Lashinsky, ISS Wants Business Both Ways, FORTUNE, June 16, 2003, at 24.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Claire Hill, Rating Agenctes Behaving Badly, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2003).
115. Id. at 1148.
116. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and




however, reveals more positive results, especially in comparing the firms with the
best governance systems versus those with the worst. Corporate governance
experts Ira Millstein and Paul MacAvoy found that those companies rated A in
their governance by the California Public Employees Retirement System
outperformed those rated "F" by over 25 percent. is
Business and Federalism Issues
In the regulatory arena, there has been a lively debate over states' rights in the
courts, and especially in the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist's
leadership. The tensions within our federal system of government have been
important ever since the nation's founding, have assumed even more significance
since the expansion of federal authority during the late New Deal years. '19 In the
past ten years, there has been a rollback in federal authority and a resurgence of
states' rights under the Rehnquist Court, also vigorously promoted by Justice
O'Connor. Decisions like US. v. Lopez, ruling unconstitutional the Gun-free
School Zones Act, 120 and US. v. Morrison, ruling unconstitutional the Violence
Against Women Act, 2' have marked a new watershed on federalism issues. While
the rollback in federal authority may please business in certain respects, the
resulting promotion of more state regulation and activism may not be so pleasing.
In fact, uniform regulation at the federal level, accompanied with a more rational
and professional approach to regulation might prove easier for business to
accommodate.
The rise in initiatives by state attorneys general and their aggressive pursuit of
investigations and litigation against certain industries became more prevalent
during the 1990s. The litigation by the states against the tobacco industry and
against Microsoft are but two examples. 122 Most prominent starting since the year
2002 has been the action by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer versus the
financial industry, relying on state laws like the Martin Act to prosecute leading
investment banking firms. 123 Some conservatives and business interests have
complained that he has invaded the legitimate turf of the Justice Department and
SEC, 124 while Spitzer and his defenders respond that he was driven to act by the
passivity and failure of the SEC under Chairman Harvey Pitt to act in a timely
i 18. Ira Millstem, & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance or
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation. 98 COLUM. L. REV 1283, 1300 (1998).
119. ROBERT NAGEL, IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 5 (2001).
120. See generally U.S.v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
121. See generally U.S. v. Momson, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
122. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK
ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); JOEL BRINKLEY & STEVE LOHR, U.S. V MICROSOFT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE LANDMARK CASE (2000); Carolyn Mayer, Attorneys General Crusade Against
Corporate Misdeeds, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2003, at E i.
123. Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, States vs. the SEC. What' all the Shouting For? BUS. WK.,
July 28, 2003, at 39; Gary Weiss, Competing Watchdogs Are Good for the Street, BUS. WK., Sept. 1,
2003, at 86.
124. Brooke A. Masters, States Role in Doubt on Wall Street, WASH. POST, July 23, 2003, at E 1.
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manner. 1
25
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court do have the ability to override state
initiatives through the doctrine of federal preemption.' 26 While the Court has not
always been sympathetic to claims of federal preemption, as in leading tobacco
cases and occupational safety cases, it will usually defer to explicit statutory
provisions of federal preemption. 2 7 This may provide an incentive for business to
lobby for more such provisions in the future. While it may seem strange for
business to advocate the expansion of federal power over the states, it may advance
efficiency concerns for business while also boosting its public reputation for
seeking constructive solutions. It may also curry favor with certain citizen groups
who would join a coalition promoting federal power and regulation against old-
guard conservative groups.
One major caveat is that the willingness of non-business interests to embrace
federal pre-emption really depends on the stringency of the uniform federal
standard to be applied. Bills proposed for uniform federal product liability
standards have floundered for the past two decades because consumer groups and
trial lawyers have objected to the more lenient standards of liability for business
embodied in these bills, whether the issue is caps on punitive damages or standards
for strict liability 128
In the summer of 2003, House capital markets subcommittee Chairman
Richard H. Baker (R-LA), proposed legislation to curb the power of state securities
regulators and attorneys general, 2 9 perhaps to clip the wings of NY state attorney
general Eliot Spitzer and his counterparts in other states. Baker and his supporters
believe that securities markets should have only one watchdog, the SEC, and that
states should not have the power to fashion remedies that change industry
practices, and certainly not enforce rules tougher than those of the SEC. SEC
Chairman William Donaldson and Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan also seem to
support that view. 131 Spitzer and his allies, however, aggressively lobbied against
the bill, and it died in committee. Given that Spitzer and the states have acted
more swiftly against industry misconduct than have the SEC and the federal
government, Wall Street firms supported Baker's initiative. 133 The criminal
charges brought by Oklahoma State Attorney General Edmondson against
125. E.J. Dionne, Defending States Rights Except on Wall Street, WASH. POST, July 22, 2003, at
AI7.
126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (the Commerce Clause).
127. See generally U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992); Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
128. Lorraine Woeilert, Tort Reform: A Little Here, A Little There, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 2003, at 60.
129. Masters, supra note 124.
130. Id.
131. Brooke Masters & Ben White, Donaldson Backs SEC Supremacy Bill, WASH. POST, July, 16,
2003, at E l.
132. Ben White & Brooke Masters, Bill to Limit State Probes of Wall St. Delayed, WASH. POST,
July 25, 2003, at El.
133. See Masters, supra note 124; Borrus & McNamee, supra note 123.
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WorldCom and four executives in August, 2003,134 when the U.S. Department of
Justice had thus far failed to act, again demonstrates the aggressive role the states
sometimes play in the face of federal delays. The tension between the states and
the federal government will certainly continue in the area of corporate financial
fraud, as in many other areas.
Given the popularity of Spitzer's actions, the rise of state activism, and the
tradition of state regulation of corporate governance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
breaks new ground by pre-empting state law on corporate governance and absent
the crisis of corporate scandals, surely would have generated much more
controversy and debate. Of course, the U.S. House of Representatives was more
resistant to the broad sweep of the law than was the Senate, 3 5 but on the heels of
the WorldCom scandal, even Republicans in the House joined the throng
supporting Sarbanes-Oxley. 36  The rather rapid passage of the law, however,
should not obscure its major departure from past regulatory approaches. As one
expert comments:
For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state law. Even
the vast expansion begun by the New Deal securities regulation laws left the
internal affairs and governance of corporations to the states. Taken
individually, each of Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions constitutes a significant
preemption of state corporate law. Taken together, they constitute the most
dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power over corporate governance since
the New Deal. 1
37
The law not only injects the SEC and the national listing exchanges into the
regulation of the structure, composition, and duties of the corporate board, but it
also regulates several aspects of executive compensation. Traditional federalism
analysts believe that the states, as "laboratories of democracy, might generate
better solutions through interstate competition, and that the one-size-fits-all
approach of Sarbanes-Oxley is particularly inappropriate when trying to design
governance models to fit different corporate cultures in vastly different
industries. 38 Since Congress has moved so far on federalizing corporate law, it is
perhaps less strange that even leading Republican legislators would now try to roll
back state securities regulations and the power of state attorneys general. Perhaps
those moves appease the efficiency interests of their business supporters, but they
also move counter to the trends of recent Republican administrations and to the
line of federalism decisions by the Rehnquist Court.
134. Christopher Stem, et al., Oklahoma Plans to Charge Ebbers, WorldCom, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 2003, at El; Christopher Stem & Brooke Masters, WorldCom, Ex-Officers Charged in Oklahoma,
WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at El; Bamaby Feder and Kurt Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom
and May Hurt the U.S. Case, N.Y TIMES, Aug, 28, 2003, at C 1.
135. Jackie Spinner, Sarbanes Circulates Auditing Reform Bill, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at AI0.
136. Dana Milbank, Both Political Parties Say Enron Proves Their Point, WASH. POST, May 8,
2002, at AS.
137 Stephen Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 26
138. Id. at 30-31.
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SARBANES-OXLEY ACT PROVISIONS
This section will first briefly state some of the leading provisions of the act
39
and then will elaborate on some contentious issues left open for regulation. The
act provides for:
I Public Accounting Oversight Board - with powers over the public
accounting profession and independent audit firms: only firms
registered with the board will be allowed to audit public companies;
accountants must disclose any civil or criminal proceedings against
them; the larges firms will be evaluated annually and smaller firms
once every three years; in case of deficiencies, audit firms can be
fined up to $15 million or barred entirely from public accounting.
40
2. Auditor Independence - prohibits the provision of specified non-
audit services, requires that permitted services be pre-approved by
the corporate board, and requires that the lead audit partner be
rotated every five years. 14l
3. Board of Directors Audit Committee - must be comprised only of
independent directors and is responsible for the appointment,
oversight, and compensation of company auditors. i42
4. Certification of Periodic Financial Reports - the CEO and CFO must
certify that financial statements fairly represent the issuer's financial
condition and results of operations. 1
43
5. Corporate Governance and Responsibility/Reimbursement of
CEO/CFO Compensation - in the event of misconduct and misstated
financial results, the CEO and CFO must repay any bonus, incentive
compensation, or profits resulting there from. 44
6. Insider Trades During Blackout Periods - directors and officers may
not trade during blackout periods, and any resulting profits must be
disgorged. 1
45
7 Loans to Officers and Directors - issuers may not make any new
loans or modify prior loans to their officers and directors.1
46
139. Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), 15 U.S.C.S. § 7201
(2003) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
140. Charles A. Bowsher, Statement before the Senate Banking Committee (Mar. 19, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.publicoversightboard.org/news 03 19 02.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2004) (Charles Bowsher, at the time of this statement, was the chairman of the Public Oversight
Board.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.
141. Robert Reilly, Summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Bankruptcy Appraisers, 2003 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 40, 1-8 (2003). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.







8. Enhanced Financial Statement Disclosures - financial statements
must reflect all material correcting adjustments identified by the
company's auditors, and the SEC shall issue rules on the disclosure
of off-balance-sheet transactions and the disclosure of pro forma
financial results.
47
9 Issuer and Management Disclosure/Insider Transactions - insider
sales and purchases of stock must be reported within two days of the
transaction.
48
10. Other Issuer and Management Disclosures - the SEC must issue
rules on the disclosure of a company's internal controls and financial
reporting procedures, whether the company has a code of ethics and
any waivers it allows, and whether the audit committee includes a
financial expert.'
49
11 Fraud and Criminal Penalties - increases or adds criminal penalties
for a number of securities and corporate governance matters,
increases the statute of limitations, provides that debts arising from
securities fraud cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, and authorizes
the SEC to freeze any payments to officers and directors during
investigations. For "knowingly" signing off on inaccurate financial
statements, the penalty is up to ten years in jail and a $1 million fine,
while for "knowingly and willingly" signing off on such statements,
the penalty is up to tweny years in jail and a $5 million fine.
50
12. SEC Resources and Authority - requires the SEC to issue rules
regarding the minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys practicing before the SEC. 15i
13. Securities Analysts and Securities Research Reports - requires the
SEC to issue rules that address conflicts of interest of securities
analysts. 1
52
14. Regulatory Studies and Reports - authorizes the SEC, Comptroller
General, and GAO to issue reports on the need for further
legislation. 153
15. Fraud and Criminal Penalties/Whistleblower Protections - creates
protection for whistleblowers and employees when they act lawfully





150. Id., Jeremy Kahn, A Taste of Success: But the Real Test for Sarbanes-Oxley is still ahead,
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16. Corporate Fraud Accountability - authorizes the SEC to prohibit
"unfit" individuals from serving as officers or directors. 155
Auditor Conflicts of Interest
According to Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, auditors are discouraged from
providing a range of non-audit services to clients.' 56 Those that are prohibited
include human resources and technology services. 5 7  Tax projects must be
approved by the client corporation's board, and the SEC has released guidelines
stipulating that the approval must be for each project proposed and cannot be on a
blanket basis. 5  In order to avoid the paperwork and processing costs that each
pre-approval would entail, some firms may spread the work among various audit
firms instead. 159
Regulation of Attorneys
Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC now requires attorneys to
report any client misconduct upward in the organization as far as the board of
directors, if necessary This is the so-called "reporting-up" or "laddering-up"
provision. More controversial has been its consideration of a "noisy
withdrawal" provision, requiring that a corporate attorney resign from representing
the firm and that the firm report any misconduct to the SEC.i6 1 In order to blunt
this possible regulation, the American Bar Association narrowly approved an
exception to the rule of attorney-client confidentiality which allows but does not
require an attorney to go to the public authorities when company officials are
violating the law in a way that harms the company 162 Attorneys are normally
required to report violations of a client only when those violations pose physical
harm to persons. The voluntary reporting standard follows the lead of forty-two
states that already allow it.163 In arguing in favor of the ABA's approach over that
of a more rigid SEC noisy-withdrawal requirement, Bart Schwartz, general counsel
to the Mony Group states, "The 'permissive reporting-out' rule approved by the
ABA leaves more discretion to corporate lawyers about when it is necessary to
divulge client confidences, and should give corporate clients more comfort that
their lawyers can continue to handle sensitive information without turning into
SEC informants.' ' |64
155. Id.
156. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 139.
157. Id.
158. Id. at §§ h (regarding preapproval of non-audit services).
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Prior to the ABA s action, the Washington state bar association was feuding
with the SEC over the issue. It argued that complying with the SEC mandate
would provide lawyers no protection from state bar sanctions for violating lawyer-
client confidentiality 165 Citing Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC argues to the contrary
that federal rules should prevail over state rules. 166 The ABA's action, however,
by making reporting outside the organization only voluntary, may have minimal
impact in the face of such state bar codes. In California, for example, the state's
Business and Professions Code provides for strict attorney-client confidentiality 167
On the other hand, if lawyers fail to exercise their option to report offenses to the
SEC, they may be subject to shareholder lawsuits by injured investors. i68
Expert assessments of the ABA's decision range from largely symbolic to
"modest, as Columbia Professor Jack Coffee says,' 69 to a "tectonic shift, as NYU
Professor Stephen Gillers states. 170 Gillers states that the ABA "to its credit
recognized that lawyers are in a public profession and have obligations to other
people. " 17 1 Coffee said the ABA amendments were "modest changes in the right
direction, under the shadow of far more sweeping change that the SEC is
considering this has real teeth, and the bar is scared to death about it.'
72
The ABA actually passed two amendments, one allowing lawyers to warn
potential victims of fraud perpetrated by their clients, and the other allowing them
to report the conduct. 173 In some states, codes of conduct already permit lawyers
to report criminal conduct, and in most states, attorneys may warn victims of fraud
if clients used the lawyers' legal work in conceiving the fraud.i74 The new ABA
amendments and SOX oblige lawyers to report fraud to the board of directors and
therefore go beyond the voluntary standard. The ABA standards go beyond
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in one respect. They cover attorney obligations to private
companies and nonprofit organizations such as unions, not just companies that
report to the SEC.1
75
Part of the pressure being exercised on law firms to help expose white-collar
crimes is also coming from the IRS. In its first action ever taken against a law
firm, the IRS is taking action in federal court to force Jenkens & Gilchrist, a Dallas
firm, to disclose details of a tax shelter plan the firm has allegedly marketed to a
165. Brooke A. Masters, New Rules Leave Lawyers In Bind on Whistle-Blowing, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 2003, at Ei.
166. Id.
167 California Business & Professions Code, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.html/
bpc_tableof contents.html (last visited Mar. I, 2004).
168. Myron Levin, ABA Code Targets Corporate Crimes; The Lawyers Group Amends Ethic
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client. 7 6 Here again, the concern is violation of the attorney-client privilege.
Regarding the rights of investors to bring private lawsuits against law firms,
the SEC has banned them from doing so unless they can show the firms are
"primary actors" causing their losses.' 7 7 Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and
others inserted that dubious provision as part of the Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995.178 Nonetheless, investors are trying to hold liable the firms of
Kirkland & Ellis and Milbank, Tweed, attorneys for various Enron entities and
investment bankers.
COMBINATION OF REGULATIONS AND SELF-REGULATION
There are several cases where agencies, both government and self-regulatory
bodies, have concurrent jurisdiction over an industry, sector, or issue. This is no
truer than in regulations of the financial sector. The Freddie Mac case is a good
example where different agencies have junsdiction and have taken action. In this
case, the SEC, Department of Justice, and the Office of Housing Enterprise
Oversight, the agency established to specifically regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, have all been involved. 79 Freddie Mac is being investigated for violating
SFAS 133, a rule passed in January 2001 to require companies to value at current
market prices its derivatives contracts. 8 Freddie Mac instead sought to actually
understate current earnings, in contrast to all the other earnings restatement cases,
in order to smooth out earnings projections over the long term and avoid the
appearance of volatility 181
In the aftermath of the WorldCom collapse, even more government agencies
and authorities have assumed important roles. The SEC investigated the
accounting fraud and came to a $500 million settlement with the company 182 The
Justice Department is prosecuting several former WorldCom executives for
criminal violations. 8 3 The Department of Justice and the Federal Communications
Commission are both investigating charges, including illegal rerouting of calls,
made by the firm's competitors. 8 4 The General Services Administration (GSA)
has ordered that WorldCom should not be able to compete for government
176. Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS Case Tests Attorney-Client Privilege, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2003, at
E3.
177 Steven Pearlsten, Not So Firm With Lawyers, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at E l.
178. Id.
179. Kathleen Day & David S. Hilzenrath, Stock Sales Followed 'Smoothing Freddie Mac Chief
Cleared$17 Million, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2003, at A].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Seems Close to Deal to Settle SEC's Fraud Case, N.Y TiMES, Nov.
5, 2002, at CI, See also Jerry Knight, WorldCom Stockholders Owe SEC Thanks for Almost Nothing,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2003, at El.
183. Christopher Stem, New Charges Brought Against CFO at WorldCom, WASH. POST, April 17,
2003, at Ei.
184. Christopher Stem, FCC Opens Probe Into WorldCom Access-Fee Allegations, WASH. POST,
July 31, 2003, at E2; see also Christopher Stern & Brooke A. Masters, US. Probes WorldCom on
Evading Access Fees, WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at A i.
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contracts, but Congress can always make a different determination. 185 Politics
could make a big difference here for WorldCom since the Federal Government is a
major customer and depends heavily on the company WorldCom's major
competitors, especially Venzon and AT&T however, also have political clout in
Congress and have been generous campaign donors. 186 Finally, WorldCom is also
accountable to a bankruptcy court, which will take into account two investigations
of the firm's collapse, one report authorized by the board and the other by the court
itself.'87 That investigation, supervised by former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh concluded, among other things, that "[i]t appears that the Company's
officers and Directors went along with Mr. Ebbers and Mr. Sullivan, even under
circumstances that suggested corporate actions were at best imprudent and at worst
inappropriate. ' 88  WorldCom had concocted an $11 billion accounting fraud,
involving the blatant violation of classifying operating expenses as capital costs, 
i89
which should have set off alarm bells for an engaged board and audit committee.
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) will also sometimes
join regulatory bodies in bringing suit or other action against alleged violators. In
one celebrated case, the NASD has filed suit against Frank Quattrone, former
research director and investment banker for Credit Suisse First Boston for failing
to supervise stock analysts, for undermining their independence by tying their
bonuses to banking fees generated, and for spinning IPOs to investment banking
clients.' 9°  Subsequently, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney launched a criminal
investigation for obstruction of justice by Quattrone, for ordering employees to
purge emails after an investigation had been launched, and may prosecute
following an initial mistnal. The SEC is also involved in the investigation. 
191
Multiple agencies and authorities have also been involved in the various
investigations and charges brought against Enron and its executives. The SEC and
federal prosecutors have brought various civil and criminal charges. 9
2  The
185. Yuri Noguchl, WorldCom Appoints Roscitt as President: Former AT&T Executive Faces
Tough Rebuilding Challenge, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2003, at E1.
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188. Chnstopher Stem, Two Reports Fault Founder on WorldCom Operation: Atmosphere Allowed
Deception, Probes Say, WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, at AI.
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has investigated Enron's manipulation of
the California energy market. 93  Further, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission has charged Enron and two executives with manipulating natural gas
and agricultural commodity prices.1
94
Exchange Rules. Beyond the combination of government rules and
regulations are the rules established by the NYSE and Nasdaq that must meet with
SEC approval. According to major legal expert Jack Coffee, it is the history and
effectiveness of the private self-regulatory organizations, not state intervention or
supervision that has built confidence in the integrity of the financial markets.1 95
The NYSE requires that all listed companies have a majority of outside directors
and that the audit and compensation committees be composed entirely of
independent directors. 196  The NYSE is also tightening its definition of
"independent, excluding those with a "material relationship" to the firm, and is
requiring non-management directors to meet in executive sessions. 197 The Nasdaq
offered parallel rules in advance of Sarbanes Oxley and also requires that an audit
committee of independent directors hire and fire the firm's auditor. While the
NYSE has never delisted a company for governance reasons, of the 670 companies
delisted by Nasdaq over 2001-02, 100 were delisted for reasons related to
corporate governance. 198
13, 2003, at CI; Peter Behr & Carrie Johnson, More Enron Charges Expected Today: Fastow Wife,
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POST, May 16, 2002, at A4.
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The NYSE, along with the SEC, is also promoting the interests of disclosure
to investors. In one area, it has backed off due to First Amendment concerns. The
NYSE had considered prohibiting Wall Street analysts from speaking with media
outlets that failed to disclose any potential conflicts of interest for analysts being
interviewed. Though disclosure of such conflicts might be important information
for investors, it did not justify the prior restraint on analyst speech.199
REMEDIES
The complex area of legal remedies involves a large range of issues and
choices: litigation versus arbitration, government versus private action, civil versus
criminal sanctions, and personal versus corporate liability The issue is also
directly connected to that of legal jurisdiction, that of the specific agency or
agencies involved, and whether a case can be brought by state or federal
authorities, or both. The sanctions differ from one agency to another and from one
level of government to another. Among the most significant issues, and perhaps
the primary one, is whether the government ought to pursue individual violators or
entire firms, whether they be corporations or audit firms.
Individual versus Corporate Liability: There is less dispute over the wisdom
of criminally prosecuting individual wrongdoers than over prosecuting
corporations. The controversy surrounding the prosecution and demise of Arthur
Andersen is a leading example of that dispute. To convict an organization also still
requires that an individual perpetrator be identified, and then a jury can hold the
organization vicariously liable. Some of the legal controversy surrounding the
guilty verdict of Andersen was the judge's ruling that different jurors could find
different executives, rather than the same one, guilty in order to hold the firm
liable.2° ° The larger practical criticism is that entire firms, and many innocent
parties, are punished for the sins of perhaps just a few when firms are held
liable.20' However, others argue that it is entirely appropriate to prosecute a firm
when its culture is that of a repeat offender or chronic violator, even if the firm's
199. Alex Berenson, A US. Push on Accounting Fraud, N.Y TIMES, April 9, 2003, available at
http://secunties.stanford.edu/news-archive/2003/20030409Headlinel iBerenson.htm (last visited
Mar. 2, 2004); N.YS.E Abandons Gag Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 2003, available at
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edu/news-archive/2003/20030409_Headline I I Berenson.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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POST, June 14, 2002, at El; Kirstin D. Gnmsley & Jackie Spinner, Some Call Andersen Verdict
Irrelevant: In Accounting Industry, Firm Viewed as Already 'Mortally Wounded' WASH. POST, June
15, 2002, at Ei ; Andersen Judge Rules Calamitous Court, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003; Carrie Johnson,
Andersen May Ask Judge to Overturn Conviction, WASH. POST, June 20,2002, at E3.
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existence is placed in jeopardy 202
Though the tide may be turning more in favor of prosecuting organizations,
the SEC has focused to date mainly on individual auditors and accountants, and the
Andersen case was brought by the Department of Justice, not by the SEC.20 3
Further, among its legal actions, the SEC has focused almost entirely on small
accounting firms and brought charges in 2002 against only two auditors working
for then Big 5 firms, while bringing actions against auditors from 15 auditors from
smaller firms.20 4 The disciplinary actions brought against smaller firms are more
often for incompetence, while the actions brought against the large firms are for
lapses of integrity 205 In total, it brought 598 enforcement actions in 2002, up 24
percent from the previous year.
One example of the action taken by the SEC against individual auditors was a
case involving PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), once the lead auditor for
Microstrategy, a company whose "accounting mirage" and inflated earnings is
credited for bursting the tech bubble,20 7 even before subsequent scandals at Enron
and WorldCom surfaced. In this case, the individual auditor was barred from
auditing publicly traded companies for a two-year period and can then apply for
reinstatement with the SEC. The SEC took a similar approach in penalizing an
audit partner with PwC who was "reckless" in auditing Tyco and ignoring signs of
trouble.208 In neither case, though, did the SEC take any action against PwC as a
firm. PwC also paid $50 million to settle a lawsuit with Microstrategy investors
who charged the firm for defrauding them by approving the company's books.20 9
The shareholders' report also charged that PwC and Microstrategy had discussed
joint business deals, jeopardizing PwC's independence and creating a conflict of
interest.
2 10
In 2002, the SEC did bring administrative charges against Ernst & Young for
violating independence rules by a joint marketing arrangement with client
company PeopleSoft. 2 1 Words by Enforcement Director Stephen Cutler indicate
202. Id., see generally BARBARA L. TOFFLER & JENNIFER RENGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING:
AMBITION, GREED AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN (2003); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2003); see also SHERRON WATKINS & MIMI SWARTZ,
POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003).
203. U.S. v. Arthur Anderson, LLP Crim. CRH-02-121, (Tex. S. Dist. Ct., Mar. 7, 2002), available
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that the SEC may bring more actions against the audit firms in the future. He has
stated:
In short, absent egregious conduct, in which senior firm managers participated or
acquiesced, the commission typically has elected not to pursue a case against the
firm itself. It is time to adopt a new enforcement model a new paradigm: one
that holds an accounting firm responsible for the actions of its partners; one that
reverses the current presumption against suing firms for an audit failure.
212
In the wake of the criminal prosecution and subsequent demise of Arthur
Andersen, however, there is one major factor that inhibits the government from
bringing criminal charges against the organization. Should it do so and cause the
downfall of yet another major accounting firm, the industry becomes even more
concentrated. The "big five" that has dwindled to the "big four" risk becoming the
"big three." Given its criminal jurisdiction, the Justice Department is thwarted
more than the SEC by this factor. By shrinking the number of major firms, it also
would make even more difficult the rotation of audit firms, discussed later in this
article. Hence, the major accounting firms may be politically insulated from
further criminal prosecution and, in a sense, may have become too big to fail.
Businesses now audited by the big four accounting firms account for a huge 99
percent of all public company sales, about which SEC Chairman William
Donaldson says, "It's a national problem. We're concerned about the long-term
implications. 213 To combat such industry concentration, the government could
award more contracts to non-big-four firms and to foreign accounting firms.
When the government seeks to hold firms and organizations liable, there are
lessons that the Arthur Andersen case teaches, most importantly that such a firm
must cooperate fully with the government. Firms will be rewarded for cooperation
and punished dearly for resistance and confrontation. As one leading observer put
it, "[tlime and time again the firm made missteps that left prosecutors
questioning its desire to resolve the case. Its efforts at internal change went
nowhere, as the partnership spun into chaos. When its lawyers suggested that
Andersen consider pleading guilty the firm's management replaced them. 21 4
There have been stiffer organizational sanctions permitted under recent
changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, giving the prosecution more leverage
and making cooperation with the government more compelling.2i 5 This is further
related to the new regulations of attorney obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Not
only are attorneys given a greater incentive to report management misconduct
upward, but the firms themselves are given incentive to waive any privilege, under
212. Id.
213. Dwyer, supra note 204.
214. Kurt Eichenwald, Miscues, Missteps, and the Fall of Andersen, N.Y TIMES, May 8, 2002, at
CI.
215. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Commission Stiffens Penalties for
White Collar Criminals (Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel010803.htm (last visited Mar.
11, 2004).
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Justice Department policies.216 The law thus encourages cooperation in various
ways, and individual employees must beware that their own personal interests that
weigh in the balance may be sacrificed by the firm. When the firm is rewarded for
cooperation, an employee can even be fired for asserting her legal freedom from
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. That has been one of the potential
consequences even as firms have sought to mitigate their sentences since the
organizational sentencing guidelines were passed in 1990.217
Civil versus Criminal Liability: While it has been less common for the
government to seek criminal penalties against auditors, aside from the obstruction
of justice prosecution of Arthur Andersen, it is becoming more common to seek
such penalties against executives in the scandal-ridden firms. Three former Tyco
executives, for example, have been charged with criminal offenses, and one of its
board members has pleaded guilty to securities fraud.2I8
The enhanced criminal penalties under Sarbanes-Oxley are also proving to be
an effective lever in building cases against violators at the top. The Justice
Department and SEC combine forces to investigate corporate fraud, and as at
companies like HealthSouth and Symbol Technologies, have pursued indictments
of mid-level and senior managers to gather evidence against those at the top.
219
With the tougher penalties, lower level managers have a greater incentive to
cooperate with the government to lighten their sentences. Still, some take a
different view. Some defense lawyers believe that the penalties are too harsh and
with more at stake, clients will actually be less willing to talk.220 Whatever
provided the incentive, nine HealthSouth executives, including three top finance
officers, have pleaded guilty to criminal charges in the case involving $2.5 billion
of overstated profits.22'
In the complex Enron case, federal prosecutors have indicted Andrew Fastow
on 78 counts and received a guilty plea from his deputy Michael Kopper.222 The
government has also brought criminal fraud charges against two other Enron
executives for trying to hide the Braveheart Internet video venture off the books
while it failed to meet the rule of having a minimum of 3 percent of its capital from
outside investors.223 The essence of the fraud is that "Enron sold its interest in
broadband to itself but pretended that there were outside investors with capital at
risk to make the transaction appear to be a true sale. 224
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Civil fines and remedies can result from either court proceedings or
administrative settlements. The SEC pursued administrative action against
Deutsche Bank AG for failing to disclose a conflict of interest in voting its shares
in favor of Hewlett Packard's (H-P) acquisition of Compaq Computer Corp.225
The Bank had business deals with H-P with more to follow were the acquisition
approved. 6 The forces supporting William Hewlett's opposition to the deal
accused H-P of buying the bank's vote. For its failure to disclose, the bank agreed
to pay $750,000, and the SEC also censured the firm and directed it to cease and
desist from further securities violations.22 7
The largest settlement ever was negotiated by the SEC with WorldCom, on
behalf of investors. WorldCom recently settled for $500 million with victimized
stock and bond holders, and fraud victims will also receive $250 million worth of
stock in the reorganized company, when it emerges from bankruptcy 228
Shareholders are normally last in line to be paid in bankruptcy proceedings, so
critics of the settlement observe that bondholders who normally receive higher
priority will be subsidizing shareholders through the settlement. 22 9 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act at least has made possible the ability to pay victims. 230 Prior to the law,
settlement money would have been paid to the U.S. Treasury 231 The penalty is the
largest ever paid by a non-Wall Street firm but is slight compared to the $180
billion in damage done to investors.232 WorldCom has also taken some measures
of internal reform, having replaced its entire board of directors and removed more
than two dozen executives who were directly or indirectly involved in the
company's accounting problems. More on the WorldCom internal reforms is
discussed below. There is serious question whether WorldCom has been
sufficiently punished by its settlement with the SEC, and some argue it should be
liquidated rather than allowed to reorganize under bankruptcy 233 Given that
WorldCom's collapse wiped out around $180 billion in shareholder value,2 34 many
competitors and critics argue the settlement is totally inadequate, even though it is
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the largest ever negotiated by the SEC.235 Some suggest the government wanted
WorldCom to emerge from bankruptcy and to survive as it now has under the MCI
label, rather than face liquidation, for a number of reasons - to prevent any adverse
impact on its 55,000 employees and the economy, to maintain its vital supplies of
data equipment to the government and defense department, and to preserve
competition in the telecommunications industry to serve antitrust values.
236
The SEC has also settled its civil charges against J.P Morgan Chase and
,,237Citigroup for helping Enron "cook the books. In announcing the $300 million
settlement, enforcement director Stephen M. Cutler sent a message to all other
financial institutions that might have facilitated fraud at other firms under
investigation, such as Freddie Mac, WorldCom, and AOL Time Warner. Cutler
stated, "If you know or have reason to know that you are helping a company
mislead its investors, you are in violation of the federal securities laws.
' 238
Corporate critics see the settlement as much too insignificant in contrast to the
damage the banks facilitated at Enron. As William Greider states:
The $300 million Enron 'settlement' government regulators worked out with the
nation's two largest banks smells so bad that even The Wall Street Journal
editorial writers gagged on the rank odor. What Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase
did, remember, was to design the funny-money financial deals that directly
pumped up Enron's profits and stock price. When Enron's fraudulent scheme
unraveled and the stock collapsed, the nation's pension funds lost somewhere
between $25 to $50 billion. And these two famous banks each profited mightily
from their role as financial architects of the great swindle. The pay-up costs will
not even require an asterisk on their balance sheets.
239
Not just corporate critics like Greider weighed in against the settlement, but
so did Business Week magazine. While acknowledging the difficulty of
demonstrating willful fraud necessary to bnng criminal charges, the amount of
$300 million would be seen as merely a cost of doing business, since the fines
represent "roughly a week's profit to the banks., 240 Especially since Sarbanes-
Oxley allows some of the fines to be credited against liability under private
securities litigation, authority Jack Coffee concludes, "I don't think there was
235. Id.
236. Stephanie N. Mehta, Well Connected; Why is Washington So Determined to Save WorldCom,
FORTUNE, June 9, 2003, at 40; see also Christopher Stern, WorldCom Wins New Federal Contract,
WASH. POST, July 19,2003, at E2.
237 Ben White and Peter Behr, Citigroup, J.P Morgan Settle over Enron Deals, WASH. POST,
July 29, 2003, at AI. See also Eichenwald, Two Banks Settle Accusations They Aided in Enron Fraud,
supra note 162.
238. Jerry Knight, Look Out, Aiders andAbettors, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at El.
239. William Greider, Crooks off the Hook, TOMPAINE.COM, Aug. 7, 2003, at
http://www.tompaine.
com/feature2.cflm/ID/8568 (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
240. Emily Thornton and Mike France, For Enron Bankers, a "Get Out of Jail Free Card, BUS.
WEEK,Aug. II, 2003, at 29.
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deterrence in these settlements. 24'
Fines versus Action Remedies: Even in civil cases, courts and especially
regulatory agencies have the option of imposing financial penalties or action-
forcing remedies, or both. The common complaint about fines or financial
settlements is that they are usually passed on to shareholders, or sometimes to
customers in the form of higher prices.242 The pain may not be borne by the actual
perpetrators, unless the penalties are so heavy that the firm or its board takes action
against the offending officers or employees. Action remedies, however, may
include pain directly inflicted on the individual offender. For instance, the SEC
may bar auditors from auditing publicly-traded companies and may even bar
executives from serving as officers or directors of a listed company 243 In the year
2000, the SEC barred thirty-eight executives from ever again serving as officers or
directors of public companies, and in the first two thirds of 2003, that number had
increased to 105, including two WorldCom financial executives. 244 The SEC has
brought legal charges against two former executives from Merrill Lynch for aiding
and abetting securities fraud at Enron for moving Nigerian ships off the books
245through a sham sale and for fraudulent energy trades. In addition to fines and
injunctions, the SEC is seeking a permanent ban to prevent the executives from
serving as officers or directors of any listed company 246 The SEC has targeted for
a similar fate executives with Qwest, HealthSouth, and Tyco.
247
Not only can the SEC bar executives from future corporate positions, but so
can the NASD. In the case against Frank Quattrone mentioned above, the NASD
is seeking to bar Quattrone from the securities industry for failing to cooperate
with the investigation. 248 The NASD also brought a different type of action-
forcing remedy against the brokerage firm Homblower & Weeks, suspending it
from publishing research for six months, since it had published "misleading and
exaggerated statements" about a stock.249 Other government agencies besides the
241. Id.
242. Holcomb and Sethi, supra note 171.
243. Amy Borrus & Mike NcNamee, Go Ahead, Make the SEC' Day, BUS. WEEK, June 2,2003,
at 27.
244. Id.
245. Came Johnson, SEC Accuses Four Former Executives at Merrill of Aiding Enron Fraud,
WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2003, at El,
246. Id.
247. Came Johnson, Tyco Auditor Barred from SEC Work: PricewaterhouseCoopers Partner said
to have
Ignored Signs, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003 at El. See also Chnstopher Stem, US. Charges Eight in
Qwest Fraud Probes, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2003, at El.
248. Walter Hamilton, NASD Regulators Charge Quattrone; Investment Banker is Accused of
'Spinning
Coveted IPO Shares and Improper Oversight of Stock Analysis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at B2; see
also Brooke A. Masters, Former Tech Banker Quattrone Indicted; Obstruction of Justice Alleged,
WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at E4; Brooke A. Masters, Quattrone Charged in Probe of CSFB; NASD
Cites IPO Trades for Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2003, at E4.
249. Patrick McGeehan, For Financial Firms, Proposed New Rules on Analysts are the Least of
Their Problems, N.Y TIMES, May 8,2002, at C2.
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SEC can at least remove executives from their present positions, or urge their
boards to do so. In the case of Freddie Mac, the OHEO agency ordered that two
executives, the president and general counsel, be removed from the company,
250
after the board had already terminated the previous CEO and two other officers
and restated earnings of $4.5 billion for the past three years.25'
When fines are the remedy, the question arises what level of fine is
appropriate and effective. Citigroup Global Markets, formerly Salomon Smith
Barney, was fined only $1 million by the NYSE for failing to give suitable advice
to WorldCom employees related to their pension holdings in company stock. 52
Salomon Smith Barney had advised the employees to borrow money to pay taxes
resulting from the exercise of stock options, rather than cash in the options. 53
That level of fine is less than a slap on the wrist.
Private Lawsuits: Perhaps the most expensive remedy for any offending firm
is that of private lawsuits brought by injured parties. In the many cases of
corporate scandals, those injured parties are usually employees, retirees, or
investors. The pension funds and institutional investors are often a greater threat
than regulatory agencies, regarding the amount of damages they can extract from
corporate offenders. The 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act, meant to limit
liability to shareholders, also gave institutional investors higher priority as lead
plaintiffs in securities cases.254 The University of California system, with its $145
million in losses following the Enron debacle, is the lead plaintiff in a class-action
suit against Enron and all of its financial backers.255 The pension funds of Ohio
and California are suing AOL Time Warner for over $100 million in losses to their
state pension funds. 25 6  Ohio and West Virginia pension funds are also suing
Freddie Mac and three former executives for securities fraud, causing almost $30
million in stock losses to those states. 25 7 Ohio also has suits pending against
Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing. 258 The California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CALPERS) estimates it lost $565 million on its WorldCom
investments, while the New York State Common Retirement Fund lost about $300
million.259 Those pension funds are also bnnging suits against the company The
250. Jonathan D. Glater, Freddie Mac Board Forced to Remove Chief Executive, N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2003, at CI. See also Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Board Told to Remove CEO; Regulators
Cite Parseghian Role in Improper Accounting; Directors Response is Unclear WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 2003, at E01.
25 1. See Carrie Johnson and Kathleen Day, Freddie Mac Ousts Three Top Executives; Shake-up at
Mortgage Giant Roils Markets, WASH. POST, June 10, 2003, at Ai (discussing the earlier action by
the Freddie Mac board and the actions by top officer that lead to the board's actions).
252. Christopher Stem, Citigroup Fined for WorldCom Advice: NYSE Says Workers Were not
Warned, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2003, at El.
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VOL. 32:2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Wisconsin state pension fund lost $36.3 million through the WorldCom collapse,
the Michigan state employee fund lost $116 million, and the Iowa state pension
fund lost $33 million.26 Michael L. Fitzgerald, state treasurer of Iowa, said:
I'm outraged. We have invested in the American marketplace and we have lost
confidence. There is now no confidence in people who are running these
businesses. No trust in them at all. Institutional investors need to pick up the




The lawsuits by all concerned private parties against Enron and Andersen will
continue for sometime. Enron workers and investors are seeking $26 billion in a
class-action suit that also names Enron and Andersen executives and board
members.262 Pnvate suits brought by investors against outside directors of Enron
for fraud and insider trading were dismissed in March 2003, for failure to show
intent by the directors.263 Suits for negligence, however, might still be possible.2M
Given that most of these shareholder suits are settled for far lesser amounts
though, the question remains what effect they really have on corporate misconduct.
For firms like Enron and Andersen that no longer exist or exist in vastly
diminished scale, the lack of connection is obvious. Even for any living entities,
though, the effect is dubious. Former SEC Commissioner and Stanford Law
Professor Joseph Grundfest concludes:
I'm not suggesting that [the class-action system] has no deterrent effect. It's just
weak compared with the criminal and the SEC enforcement mechanisms. The
reason is that only 0.5 percent of the settlements in the fifteen largest settlements
came out of the pockets of the wrongdoer. The vast amount of the money that is
used to fund these settlements comes from the corporation, the defendant in the
action. And who owns the corporation? The shareholders. The shareholders are
also the plaintiffs who get the recovery. So there is no secunties fairy paying the
settlements. We're simply moving money from investors' right pocket to
investors' left pocket - and paying lawyers a lot for moving the money around.265
Arbitration versus Litigation: The choice between arbitration and litigation is
important for private plaintiffs bringing action against investment analysts and
brokers, as well as against their firms. There is also a regulatory component
provided by the $1.4 billion Wall Street settlement, as aggrieved investors who
were victimized by fraudulent stock ratings might claim relief from the restitution
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Five Ex-Andersen Execs Won't Face Enron Shareholder Suit: Judge Throws out Claims
Against Group Including In-house Lawyer Claims Against Others Proceed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2003, at B7
263. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Outside Directors Win Round in Court, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at C6.
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265. Joseph Grundfest & Nicholas Varchaver, Winona, Martha & the Securities Fairy, FORTUNE,
Aug. 11, 2003, at 50.
2004
DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
fund established by the settlement. 266 Those bringing individual court cases are
having a difficult time recovering, however.
In the main, investors are left with the remedies provided by arbitration, since
a 1987 Supreme Court case held that securities firms may force their clients into
arbitration when provided by contract.267 Plaintiffs complain that arbitration tends
to favor the industry, and studies tend to bear that out.268 In the case of California,
however, the arbitration requirement may be eroded or bypassed due to a state
ethics law that requires arbitrators to disclose their financial dealings and any
conflicts of interest. The NASD, which hears 90 percent of all securities
arbitrations, has asked any claimants to waive the application of the new law, and
securities firms argue the law should be preempted by federal regulations.269 A
federal appellate court has just upheld the law in the face of those arguments.270
Some recovery may be easier in arbitration than in court, as arbitrators tend to
be more concerned about a fair result than about technical procedures and burdens
of proof. Nonetheless, even in arbitration, an investor or complainant must
demonstrate "specific reliance" on the advice of a broker or analyst in causing
his/her loss, 271 which is often difficult to show. Some state laws give investors
broader relief if they can show that an adviser failed to disclose pertinent facts,
such as an investment banking relationship with the covered company 272
Arbitration does not lend itself to a mass-tort class-action approach, but some
lawyers are trying it anyway in the research analyst cases. One team of lawyers
has signed up 9,000 potential plaintiffs through the website stockmarketfraud.com,
and a Florida law firm represents 6,000 more.273
266. Anitha Reddy, Investors Eligible for Restitution; Settlement will also Aid Class Actions,
WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at El. See also Ben White and Kathleen Day, SEC Approves Wall Street
Settlement; Conflicts of Interest Targeted, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2003, at Al, Ben White, SEC
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on Restitution Money; Fund Investors Unlikely to get Piece of Wall Street' $387.5 Million Pie,
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272. See Masters, supra note 268.
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The individual arbitrations conducted thus far have not been successful for
injured investors. About a dozen cases, ranging all the way up to $30 million in
claimed damages have been decided, and only two plaintiffs have received any
awards.274 Still the cases have really only begun. The NASD has received around
300 filed cases, with thousands more expected, and the NYSE has received almost
100.275
IMPACT OF REGULATION
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the debate now ensues over its impact.
Will it deter fraud? Will the costs of compliance be excessive? Will it improve
boards of directors or make it more difficult to attract top candidates? Will it make
management too cautious and risk averse? Will it delay too many decisions and
drive them to the top9 Most important, will it restore investor confidence? The
answers vary from one expert to another. It may also take a long time to assess the
effectiveness of the act and new controls, since financial fraud is more typical at
the end of long bull runs on Wall Street.
Cost of Controls: Beyond the debate over the definition of proper "internal
controls, there is a deep concern over the cost of those controls. Some see
Sarbanes-Oxley as ironically a windfall for the accounting industry One business
journalist suggests it may raise audit fees by 30-100 percent.276 Colleen A.
Sayther, chief executive of Financial Executives International said, "With all due
respect to the accounting firms, there is a financial incentive for them to increase
their amount of testing., 277 Greg W Matz, director of internal audit at Agilent
Technologies, said, "[c]ontrols are not free. [Companies may] overspend without a
lot of benefit or safety for the investor., 27  Meanwhile, William J. McDonough,
chairman of the Public Accounting Oversight Board, maintains, in my view,
good internal controls are cost effective and once put in place more than justify the
expense involved. 279
Going Private: Considering these costs, some firms have decided to either
remain private or move from public back to private, partially in order to avoid the
demands of Sarbanes Oxley. 280 Hence, the law does nothing to improve their
corporate governance. In 2002, ninety-seven firms filed requests with the SEC to
274. See Masters, supra note 268.
275. Id.
276. Came Johnson, Stiffer Accounting Standards Debated: Tougher Review Rules Planned,
WASH. POST, Aug. 9,2003, at El.
277. Id.
278. Id., See also Julie Hirschfield Davis, For Sarbanes, the Grumbling was Expected, BALT.
SUN, July 29, 2003, at ID (for additional estimates of compliance costs. The article notes that the
Business Roundtable finds its member firms spending between $1 million and $10 million annually due
to the new Sarbanes-Oxley law. Further, business law and consulting firm Foley & Lardner found that
the cost of being a publicly traded firm has increased 100 percent due to new compliance
requirements.).
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go private, and by July 31, 2003, sixty-seven firms had applied to go private.
2
81
Not only are the costs of compliance high for firms with little capital, but
premiums for director and officer insurance policies have increased 30-40 percent
since Sarbanes Oxley passed.28 2 Small firms thus have great difficulty attracting
willing outside directors. Given the Wall Street settlement with investment
banking firms, and their commensurate needs to downsize among their analyst
corps, some thinly traded small companies no longer enjoy analyst coverage at all.
Hence, the benefits of remaining public pale in contrast to the costs. As the CFO
of Tumbleweed, a small restaurant chain, put it, "We didn't see much value in
being public. It was costing us a lot of extra money. Then Sarbanes-Oxley came
along and that was the last straw. 283  Tom Taulli, a finance professor at the
University of Southern California concludes that, with the added costs and
restrictions of Sarbanes-Oxley, the tradeoffs are looking much better to go
private."2 4
Recruiting Board Members: Given the enhanced responsibilities of directors
and the stronger criminal penalties, some believe that many qualified candidates
will now find board positions far less attractive and that it will be difficult to build
strong boards. As defense attorney Ira Lee Sorkin states, "Why would someone
want to be a director and face all this potential exposure?
28 5
Executive Reactions: Not surprisingly, most senior executives have a dim
view of Sarbanes-Oxley as they might of most other regulation. A survey of 192
senior executives in the July 28, 2003 Financial Times found that 60 percent
believe that reform has gone too far.28 6 Further, a poll of CFOs and managing
directors found that only 30 percent have a good opinion of Sarbanes Oxley 287
When trying to gauge the effectiveness of new reforms, professional money
managers are skeptical of their likely effect. In a recent survey, just 23 percent
said recent antifraud measures had been effective, and 60 percent doubted even the
recent Wall Street settlement would improve the quality of brokerage research.2 88
Still, half of the respondents supported the efforts of local and state regulators. As
the chief coordinator of the study reported, "The support of these fund managers
for the state securities regulators suggests somewhat of a lack of confidence in the
ability of the S.E.C. to do its job. 2 9
Internal Investigations: Whatever actual change in corporate behavior is
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produced by new regulations, the scandals certainly have invited close scrutiny and
outside pressure brought by former top SEC officials and law enforcement officers.
Investigators have been installed by courts and boards of directors to supervise
internal investigations that have produced enlightening reports.290 Former SEC
general counsel William McLucas has supervised internal investigations at Enron,
WorldCom (at the invitation of the board), and Qwest Communications. 29' Former
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh supervised another investigation of
WorldCom for the bankruptcy court, and former SEC official Gregory S. Bruch
coordinated the internal investigation at Global Crossing.292  Attorney David
Boies, who litigated the monopoly case against Microsoft, supervised internal
investigations of Tyco,293 while former SEC counsel Richard Doty conducted an
internal investigation of Freddie Mac.294 The bankruptcy judge in the Enron case
appointed R. Neal Batson, an Atlanta attorney, who concluded creditors might be
entitled to recover $5 billion in assets improperly transferred to outside
partnerships and to $74 million in loans received by Chairman Kenneth Lay 295 He
also found that CFO Fastow received twice as much as reported, and that Enron
manipulated the tax laws to create "phantom" tax losses. 2%
Corporate Monitors: The government has also installed former SEC
Chairman Richard Breeden to monitor and approve of business decisions at
WorldCom, as Gregory Bruch is now doing for U.S. Technologies. 297  Such
officials provide a valuable service in discovenng all the elements of corporate
misconduct, in the case of investigations, and of setting the ship aright again, in the
case of corporate monitors.298
290. One example is the internal investigative report on Enron, known as the Powers Report. The
investigation was chaired by William C. Powers, Jr., an outside director on the Enron board and Dean
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UNFINISHED BUSINESS: PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND ALTERNATIVE REGULATIONS
Some see Sarbanes-Oxley as misdirected, that it really won't do much to cure
most of the corporate abuses and real problems of corporate governance. Some
say the real problem is not lack of director independence but directors simply not
working hard enough. 299 Separating auditing from non-audit services won't do
much, some say, because the auditor still has an interest in ingratiating the client in
order to retain its audit business.3°° As one analyst puts it," even if auditing
firms have to get out of the consulting business, the temptation for auditors to
please the people they are paid to police will still be there.",30 ' The better approach
is one of a genuine check and balance between two audit firms, through a forensic
audit or periodic rotation of audit firms.
Alternative Reforms: Before resigning as SEC Chairman and even before the
debate over Sarbanes-Oxley Harvey Pitt suggested that companies be subject
periodically to full-scale forensic audits by a different audit firm.30 2 Regular
auditors normally review just a sample of company records and take
management's words at face value. Forensic audits probe more deeply and would
more likely uncover any real problems.30 3 Other experts have suggested regular
rotation of the audit firm, not just of the auditors within a firm, going well beyond
the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley which only requires the two pnncipal partners
involved in the audit be rotated every five years. 304 Bypassing the normal biases
and relationships built up over time between a firm and its client is-the only path
that some see to true independence. Requiring forensic audits might create a lot of
new business for audit firms, so one might suspect they would lobby for such a
rule. More frequent rotation, however, might create disruption and transaction
costs and therefore stimulate political opposition by the auditors.
Only Auditing: If Sarbanes-Oxley has minimal impact, another option worth
considering is what Paul Volcker suggested as his condition of leading Arthur
Andersen - forego consulting altogether and stick to auditing.0 5 Despite the
financial and business sacrifices that would entail for the firm, perhaps a model
built for modest success and integrity of the business system overall is a better
alternative for the future. As Volcker said, "We've missed an opportunity of
having an accounting firm of some weight doing auditing the way it seems to me it
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should be done. Andersen is now a very lame horse, a lame horse that got shot in
the head." 3°6 Further, as the U.S. editor and a correspondent for the Economist
contend:
Enron is certainly an opportunity to instigate some long overdue corporate
reforms. It was always a recipe for disaster that accountants were allowed to do
consulting. It was always a scandal that chief executives were allowed to design
their own remuneration packages. Despite some screams from the business lobby,




Ban Tax Services: While Sarbanes-Oxley bans auditors from providing
certain kinds of consulting services - human resources and technology systems, it
has not banned tax services or consulting on tax shelters, leaving that up to
corporate audit committees to approve or not.30 8 In January 2003, the SEC voted to
allow tax services and consulting to continue, subject to approval by corporate
boards and under the supervision of audit committees.3 9
Abolish Banking/Brokerage Combination: As for the provision in the Wall
Street settlement requiring that analysts not be compensated for any investment
banking business brought to the firm nor go on "road shows" for clients with the
bankers, some maintain that is misdirected and insufficient as well. 310  Even
without direct contact with the bankers and incentive pay based on touting client
stocks, everyone in the firm knows that its overall success is inextricably tied to
that of its clients. Scott Cleland of the Precursor Group, an independent research
firm, observes that the entire model, based on research, trading, and banking is
inherently conflicted.31 1 That diagnosis leads to the conclusion that investment
banking and securities analysis/brokerage should not exist under the same roof.
They should be entirely separated, based on the model of the Precursor Group. For
investment banking firms to be required to supplement their own analysis with that
of truly independent firms, as stipulated by the Wall Street Settlement, might
insure some check and balance, but is a tacit admission that the investment
banking/analysis model has flaws.
Mutual Fund Industry Regulation: With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
attention is shifting from corporate fraud to abuses by the mutual fund industry
More aggressive than the SEC on this score is Rep. Richard Baker (R-LA), who
has proposed legislation requinng greater disclosure of fees paid by individual
investors, disclosure of the compensation structure for fund managers, and
regulation of "soft dollar" commissions, in which funds pay higher than normal
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commissions in return for research, with the costs passed on to fund investors.3t 2
The Baker bill also would increase the mandated percentage of independent
directors on fund boards from 40 percent to 67 percent.31 3
That legislation, the Mutual Fund Integrity and Fee Transparency Act of
2003, managed to get through the House Financial Services Committee, but is
likely to die on the House floor 314 Industry lobbyists succeeded in watenng down
the final reform bill, and reform advocate Jack Bogle concluded, "If a journey of a
thousand miles begins with a single step, I'd say this legislation still leaves us
many hundreds of miles to go.'315 Jack Bogle has roundly criticized the industry
he helped create and has been a crusader for reform.3i6 He charges most funds with
charging excessive fees, with insufficient disclosure of portfolio holdings, with
failing to provide an informed choice to investors, with failing to compensate fund
managers according to their performance, with excessively turning over stock
holdings, with failing to disclose its votes on shareholder resolutions, with
insufficiently holding management in invested firms accountable, and when all is
said and done, with underperforming the market.3i 7 Bogle and others believe the
governance and practices of this industry are the next best targets and candidates
for reform.
3t8
Governance of the Stock Exchanges: One matter not addressed by Sarbanes-
Oxley related to the integrity of the listing process itself concerns the governance
of the major stock exchanges, especially the NYSE. The controversy surrounding
Chairman Richard Grasso's $10 million salary in 2002, and his deferred
compensation package of $139 million, has brought more scrutiny to the NYSE's
integrity 319 That Grasso and the founder of Home Depot sat on each other's
320compensation committees also raised questions of NYSE's governance process.
While the self-regulatory organizations will require listed companies to have a
majority of independent directors by October 2004, they could set a better example
by themselves having more independence on their own boards. 321 Ten of the
twenty-seven board members of the NYSE were from either listed companies or
the securities industry prior to new NYSE Director John Reed downsizing the
312. Floyd Noms, For Mutual Funds, Calls for Reform, N.Y TIMES, June 15,2003, at 3.7
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board, and that is also true of six of the twenty-one NASDAQ board members.
322
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer contends that, "Fixing self-regulation is
perhaps the most important policy issue facing the SEC. 323
MARKET REFORMS
As noted, there are compliance costs and administrative costs from Sarbanes-
Oxley that have met with criticism. Most of the costs are surely yet to be realized.
Further, there are questions whether the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are
misdirected and will markedly improve corporate governance. As The Economist
concludes, "[n]ew federal laws, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, have created a
dense thicket of rules prescribing good behaviour in the boardroom. But the
system's essential features - weak boards, muted shareholder participation and
sweeping power for the boss - so far remain intact."324 At the same time, the
corporate scandals have generated a spint of reform in the marketplace that has
produced other results. Whether the reforms voluntarily adopted by corporations
will turn out to be better than the widespread reforms forced by regulation remain
to be seen, but scandal-ridden companies like WorldCom are actually leading the
way toward the most ambitious reforms. MCI/WorldCom will be adopting many
of the seventy-eight reforms urged in the Breeden Report, "Restoring Trust.
' 325
Most of the reforms go well beyond the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley The
major reforms in corporate governance recommended include:
Outside director as chairman of board;
Full independence for all directors;
Ban CEO from serving on any other corporate boards;
CEO salary capped at $15 million without shareholder approval;
When board is divided on new candidates, contested elections must be
held;
Heavier director workload, salary increased to $150,000;
Explicit dividend policy, paying 25 percent of net profits;
Electronic "town hall" meetings on company website ideas with 20
percent support go to annual meeting; and,
Governance rules become part of articles of incorporation, not corporate
bylaws, and can be changed only with shareholder approval.326
In the case of WorldCom, of course, there are unique factors that may have
propelled the company to take more drastic steps in reforming itself. Those factors
include:
The extent of damage created to shareholders by the collapse of
WorldCom, to the tune of $180 billion in lost market capitalization;
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The fact that WorldCom's reorganization under the bankruptcy laws has
been roundly criticized by those who believe the company should instead
be liquidated;
The blatant nature of the company's accounting fraud and the fact that
four top executives have already pleaded guilty-
The criticism of the company's $750 million settlement with the SEC as
being totally insufficient;
The assault brought against MCI/WorldCom by its competitors (Verizon,
AT&T and SBC) and their political allies in Congress. AT&T has even
brought a suit under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act) against MCI/WorldCom for its illegal routing of
phone calls;
The sweeping and harsh criticisms of the company's board and senior
management by the McLucas Report, requested by the company's board,
and by the Thornburgh Report, requested by the bankruptcy judge;
The company's favored position as a major government contractor, along
with the decision by the Government Services Administration (GSA) that
the company be suspended from bidding on any new government
contracts; and,
The criminal charges for securities fraud brought by the state attorney
general of Oklahoma against the company and its senior executives, likely
to be followed by similar charges by other states. 27
Given all of these political and legal pressures, the company perhaps felt it had to
take bold steps, in hopes of defusing some of those pressures. Other companies
not facing such a barrage of forces are unlikely to adopt such ambitious internal
reforms.
GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Changes in corporate governance are taking place in other political-economic
systems as well, though not always parallel to those changes in the U.S. There are
other pressing legal issues surrounding global corporate governance as well,
including the application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to overseas auditors, the scope
and integrity of foreign regulatory bodies, and the evolution of global accounting
standards.
Corporate Governance Standards in other Countries: The roles of corporate
boards and shareholders are being debated in other countries, just as they are in the
U.S., but with some marked differences, depending on the country or region.328
327 Christopher Stem, et al., Oklahoma Plans to Charge Ebbers, WorldCom, WASH. POST, Aug.
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Wisely or not, attention has focused on the independence of boards and directors in
the U.S. That is somewhat true of other countries as well, but their requirements
and laws often have a different emphasis. For instance, following the publication
of the Cadbury Commission recommendations in 1992, corporations in the UK
have gone much further than American companies in separating the roles of
chairman and CEO.32 9 While in 1990, 90 percent of both U.S. and U.K. companies
combined the CEO and chairman positions, about 85 percent of FTSE 100
companies today separate those positions, while the situation is still the same in the
U.S.
33 0 The emphasis on empowering independent (or non-executive) directors
has occurred more recently in the U.K. and earlier in the U.S. The Higgs Report
includes two recommendations that most corporate chairmen find objectionable -
that a senior non-executive be designated on the board, opposed by 82 percent of
all chairmen; and a nomination committee be chaired by an independent non-
executive director, opposed by 87 percent of all chairmen.33 '
In France, independent directors are becoming somewhat more common.
There are no regulatory standards on independence, as in the U.S., but high-level
reports have recommended that the percentage of independent directors be
increased, the first report recommending a level of one third, and the second report
recommending one half. Genuine independence is more problematic, as most
corporate board members represent the French elite and are graduates of two
exclusive institutions of higher education.332 Some companies, especially those
with well publicized problems, have nonetheless moved in the direction of more
independent boards. Vivendi Universal, with the controversy surrounding its
accounting and CEO compensation, now has an audit committee completely filled
with independent directors.333 Moreover, the number of European boards having at
least one independent member, no great progress by U.S. standards, has
nonetheless risen from 53 percent in 2001 to 59 percent in 2002.334
In South Korea, with its history of poor corporate governance, family
dynasties called chaebol rule over large conglomerates, with opaque subcompanies
controlled through extensive networks of cross-shareholding. 335 While the boards
of such companies formerly had no outside directors, the situation is slowly
changing. At Samsung Electronics, half of its fourteen board members are now
outsiders, and its audit committee is totally composed of outsiders.336 KT
Corporation, the largest phone and broadband company in Korea, just recently
L. 341 (2002); Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in
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privatized, is one of few companies in Asia with an independent director as
chairman of the board.337
Beyond the issue of independent boards, not as big an issue in other countries
as in the U.S., there has been a movement in many global regions toward the
adoption of board committee structures. Companies in the U.K. and European
countries most often have compensation or remuneration committees, along with
audit committees. 338 Leading companies in Japan, like Sony and Hitachi, have also
put such committees in place.339 Corporate governance codes, while setting only
voluntary standards, are becoming more common throughout Europe. During
2002, Spain and Germany introduced governance codes for public companies,
while Italy and France updated their own codes.340 The German Stock Corporation
Act also requires companies to disclose how well they comply with the corporate
governance code.341 Over time, the European Commission also intends to
harmonize the over 40 European corporate governance codes.342
Boards all across the globe are now holding CEOs more accountable for their
failures to perform while in office. CEO turnover is up "192 percent in Europe and
140 percent in the Asia/Pacific region since 1995, and 45 percent of all CEO
replacements in the Asia/Pacific region in 2002 were related to corporate
performance. 343 The percentage of performance-related dismissals increased ten-
fold between 2001 and 2002.34 Japan also revised its commercial code in 2002 to
encourage companies to have outside directors.345
Despite increased accountability inattentive boards that fail to exercise
diligence are a common problem in other countries, just as they are in the U.S.
Boards dominated by strong-willed CEOs are also just as common in other
countries as in the U.S. For instance, Cees van der Hoeven, CEO of Ahold, was a
growth- and acquisition-focused executive and in many ways Europe's counterpart
to General Electric's Jack Welch.346 After the scandal surfaced, the company's
board rejected his offer to resign due to his personality and power of persuasion.347
In other words, the board may have been too intimidated to even allow the CEO to
fall on his own sword.
Shareholder Activism: Shareholder activism is much more prevalent in the
U.S. than in other countries, but the gap is narrowing in two ways. First, U.S.
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shareholder groups, whether church organizations like the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility or mainstream institutional shareholders, will
occasionally challenge the practices of firms in which they own shares that are
based in other countries. That trend moved forward in the 1990s. For instance, in
Europe, U.S. pension funds like TIAA-CREF which has an aggressive corporate
governance department, are joining forces with European funds to bring pressure
348on companies based in Europe. More recently, shareholders in other countries
have organized to pressure companies in their own homelands. As one scholar put
it, After years of relative isolation as pnmarily U.S. and British phenomenon,
shareholder activism has finally shown signs of going global. 34 9  For instance,
related to the Ahold scandal, a Dutch shareholder watchdog group called the
Foundation for Investigation of Business Information has applied pressure for the
CEO to return a large portion of his compensation. 350  There is also a Dutch
Association of Shareholders, a more traditional group.35 In France, since Alcatel
has sought investors in the U.S. capital market, it has faced pressure from U.S.
shareholder interests, while it has also had to face increasing pressure from French
shareholders.352 France now faces the question whether it is moving more in the
direction of the American "shareholder democracy" model and abandoning its
previous "stakeholder" model.3 53
Having acknowledged the growing activism of shareholders in the U.S., there
are still corporate governance experts who claim that shareholder powers pale in
contrast to those of directors, since the American model is much more director-
centric.354 In the U.S. and under the Delaware code, Bainbridge argues,
"Shareholder control nghts are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part of
corporate governance., 35 5 Even as to institutional investors, he states:
There is relatively little evidence that institutional investor activism has
mattered. Although about fifty percent of equity securities are owned by
institutions, large blocks held by a single investor are rare, and few U.S.
corporations have any institutional shareholders who own more than five-to-ten
percent of their stock. Even the most active institutional investors spend only
trifling amounts on corporate governance activism. Institutions devote little effort
to monitonng management; to the contrary, they typically disclaim the ability or
desire to decide company-specific policy questions. They rarely conduct proxy
348. Capell, supra note 333.
349. Perry E. Wallace, The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Shareholder Protection.
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solicitations or put forward shareholder proposals.
356
That view of course conflicts with others discussed above. Meanwhile, even
though the U.K. shares a common law foundation with the U.S., as well as many
features of its corporate model, there the emphasis is much more on shareholder
rights and powers. Hence, while directors are held much more accountable for
executive salaries in the U.S., the U.K. has recently given shareholders the power
to approve of CEO pay packages.
Even though shareholder meetings of Japanese companies have been
historically friendly and quiet, they have also contended with professional
disrupters, known as sokaiya, who demand hush money from corporations
involved in scandal.357 Companies have largely succeeded in thwarting those
elements, but now legitimate shareholders have begun challenging management in
proxy votes.358
In South Korea, foreigners own more than a third of the shares of companies
listed on the Seoul stock exchange, and they are the primary forces promoting
corporate governance reform.359 Indigenous political forces also have the issue on
their agenda, especially since the stock manipulation scandal involving SK
Corporation, the country's third largest conglomerate.360 A group called People's
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy is seeking tighter restrictions on cross-
shareholding, more outside directors, the ability to bring class action suits, and
greater separation between banks and manufacturing companies.
36'
Organized shareholder groups are also forming in other countries,
counterparts to the shareholder activist groups in the U.S. Beyond the Dutch
groups mentioned above, South Korea has another group called the Center for
Good Corporate Governance, and in the region, there is an Asian Corporate
362Governance Association. In France, the major shareholder group is the
Association pour la Defense des Actionnaires Minoritaires (ADAM).
63
Pension funds have long been activist in the U.S., but mutual funds much less
so, and hence the encouragement of Jack Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Funds,
for mutual funds to exert much more pressure on corporate managements. 364 In
European countries, such as the United Kingdom, activism by both pension funds
and mutual funds has been at a much lower decibel, as only about 50 percent of all
shares are voted, whereas the figure is closer to 80 percent in the U.S. 365 However,
the volume is growing. Germany's second largest mutual fund is moving in an
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activist direction, and the U.K.'s Institutional Shareholders Committee,
representing pension funds, insurers, and mutual funds has adopted an activist
code. Reflecting trends in the U.S., the U.K might also force funds to disclose how
they vote on proxy resolutions.' 66
Shareholder v. Stakeholder Models: Many countries are following the
Western model of corporate law and governance, including the wide dispersion of
ownership to shareholders, in order to be listed on one of the U.S. stock exchanges
and get access to greater capital in the U.S. Nevertheless, some experts believe it
is arrogant and imperialistic for the U.S. to believe this trend is inevitable and to
believe that its model of corporate governance is necessarily better.367 Other
models favor block ownership of shares, sometimes held by banks or families or
other constituents, and emphasize accountability to other stakeholders besides
shareholders. 368  One example is the European system of co-determination that
favors accountability to labor through two-tiered boards of directors. In the face of
other models, global convergence along the lines of the U.S. corporate governance
model will likely never occur. As one critic puts it:
The self-anointed corporate governance experts, elite as they may be in the United
States corporate law academy, are not cognizant of the real issues of the twenty
first century. Their advocacy of 'global' convergence, and that long the lines of
United States style corporate governance, is not based upon 'global'
developments, is culturally chauvinistic, and is anachronistic.
369
A rich body of literature exists on the variables that account for the
differences between shareholder and stakeholder accountability models. Why does
one country embrace the shareholder model while another country follows the
stakeholder model? One leading theory contends it is the quality of corporate law
(QCL) that accounts for the difference and that common law systems facilitate the
dispersion of shares and minority rights of shareholders, while civil law systems
more often promote concentrated ownership with accountability to stakeholders.37 °
This theory has generated a fair amount of criticism and counter-theories. John
Coffee argues that the existence of a common law or civil law system has very
little to do with the dispersion of ownership and shareholder power.371 Were that
the case, European civil law countries would not be able to move to a more
shareholder-centric system, as many are now doing, and transitional economies
with civil law systems would forever be trapped into a system of concentrated
ownership. The QCL theory also cannot explain the thriving securities market in
the Netherlands, a civil law country Coffee instead argues that the absence of
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state supervision is the critical factor leading to dispersion of ownership. 372 In
such environments, as in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada, vibrant stock exchanges
and self-regulatory systems emerge. They in turn give rise to accommodating
common law systems, rather than the other way around. Coffee believes the QCL
theorists have the causal chain backwards.3 73 It is liquidity and stock exchanges
that produce legal systems protective of shareholder rights.
To this debate, Mark Roe injects a political thesis. He argues that the type of
corporate governance followed by a given system is determined by the politics
underlying that system. 374 The legal system and type of state supervision are not
the critical variables but the nature of the overall political system.375 He maintains,
through an analysis of wide-ranging comparative examples, that social
democracies promote concentrated ownership and accountability to stakeholders,
while capitalist democracies promote dispersed ownership and shareholder
powers.3 76 It is social democracies that strengthen the claims of non-shareholders
such as labor. Peter Gourevitch offers a sympathetic critique of Roe's work,
believing it is essentially accurate, but still questions some of its elements.377 Roe
and Gourevitch are both political scientists, so it is not strange that they would
both stress the importance of the political system. Gourevitch argues that Roe
focuses too much on the overall political system and ignores such variables within
any given system as issues, interest groups, and institutions. 378 Any combination
of those forces, even in a social democracy, could serve to empower shareholders
and create dispersed ownership. Conversely, they might also lead to concentrated
ownership and stakeholder empowerment in a capitalist democracy. Even in the
U.S., there is an active debate within the academy and larger political society over
the relative power of shareholders and other stakeholders, over the ownership
structure of major corporations, and over the range of corporate accountability and
obligations.
Global Accounting Standards: The corporate scandals in the U.S., along with
the debate over conflicting standards of expensing stock options, have highlighted
the differences between U.S. and other country standards. The U.S. is no longer
viewed as the gold standard of either corporate governance or accounting
standards. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has led the way
in the expensing of stock options, for example, with the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) about to follow Some Europeans view its standards
based on principles as more fair and less susceptible to abuse and corruption than
the U.S. rules-based standards based on rules.379 Ironically, the Roman law or code
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law countries of France and Germany have more general and flexible accounting
standards than do the common law countries of the U.S. and U.K.380
There are other differences as well. The common-law countries of the U.S.,
U.K., Canada, and Australia are more "shareholder-focused" in their governance
and accounting standards, while the code-law countries of Japan, Germany, and
France represent bank-dominated economies and are more "stakeholder
focused."3 81 They also tend to demand less transparency than their common-law
382counterparts. 2 Belying the accusation that U.S. standards tend to encourage more
reckless earnings management, one study found that:
[Aiccounting earnings in common law countries are more conservative than
reported earnings in code law countries, arising out of the arm's-length
relationship between contracting parties (managers and shareholders).
Reviewing the results of earnings suggests that bad news is incorporated more
slowly and good news more quickly in code law than in common law countries.
3 83
Indeed, when Daimler-Benz conformed its earnings statements to U.S.




With the differences in U.S. and global accounting standards, and the
criticisms of U.S. corporate scandals, there is a movement toward convergence of
standards. European companies that have used GAAP standards to date will be
moving toward international accounting standards. The goal of the FASB and
IASB is to have uniform standards created by 2005.385 Currently, the rules of the
two bodies cover the U.S. and almost fifty other countries.3s James Hamngton of
PricewaterhouseCoopers states, "[y]ou're looking at a whole paradigm of how the
rules are made. It's a momentous change. 38 7
Included among the advantages of convergence are lower compliance costs
for transnational enterprises and the stimulation of more global capital flows. 388
On the debit side, even with uniform and flexible standards, the implementation of
those standards will vary according to national and institutional cultures. 389 As to
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The Enron debacle, though having drawn great attention in the IFRS dialogue, is
not an indicator of any fundamental accounting or regulatory system failure.
Rather, it is a case of corrupt management that was seeking technicalities behind
which to perpetrate investor fraud. It appears that its primary infraction,
nondisclosure of off-balance sheet financing, might be more clearly prohibited
under IFRS. That, however, would not necessarily have precluded them from
fraudulent tactics under the international system, because the IFRS is generally
less structured than U.S. GAAP and more interpretive latitude is available to
corporate accountants.
390
Supporting the view that international accounting standards might create even
more chances for manipulation, an accounting expert stated, "[tihere's all this talk
about how international accounting standards are better. When I hear that it just
makes me sick to my stomach because I think it's so wrong. There's more
flexibility in the international standards. It makes it where it's easier to do the
kinds of things you want to do. .If they want to hide it, they're going to hide
it."9
39 1
Global Securities and Governance Standards: Beyond the effort to harmonize
accounting standards, international organizations are also attempting to harmonize
securities and corporate governance standards. The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), formed in 1974, is composed of 161 securities
regulatory agencies from vanous parts of the world that agree: (1) to cooperate to
promote high standards of regulation; (2) to exchange information to promote the
development of securities markets; (3) to establish standards of effective
surveillance of international secunties transactions; and (4) to provide mutual
assistance to promote effective enforcement and the integrity of markets.392
Meanwhile, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is attempting to promote and harmonize global corporate governance
standards.393 Examining its website one will see the areas of emphasis of its Ad
Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance. 394 The five sections of its governance
principals cover the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders,
the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and the role of the board.3 95
Application of Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Foreign Firms: The Public Accounting
Oversight Board has recommended that auditors of foreign companies whose
shares are traded on U.S. exchanges must register with the SEC. 396  Such
390. Id.
391. Carrie Johnson, Deloitte Probe to Test Reach of U.S. Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2003, at El.
392. Felicia Kung, The International Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Rationalization of
Regulatory Internationalization, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 443, 465-66.
393. Colin Mayer, Developing the Rules for Corporate Governance, FiN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at 2;
see also Christopher Adams, Think Tank Reihinks Its Role, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at 4. See also
Jane Martinson, OECD Code to Safeguard Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, April 10, 1999, at 5.
394. Organisation (sic) for Economic Cooperation and Development, Principles of Corporate
Governance, April, 1998, at http://www,oecd.org/dataoecd/47/50/4347646.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2004).
395. Id. at 6.
396. Carrie Johnson, Accounting Board Wants Foreign Firms to Register WASH. POST, Mar. 5,
VOL. 32:2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
registration may also include annual inspections and the possibility of disciplinary
action being taken. Left undecided are whether the inspections might extend
overseas and whether overseas branches of Big Four American firms will be
treated differently from audit companies based abroad. Some legislators such as
Senators Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and Jon Corzme (D-N.J.) are concerned that
if foreign auditors are exempted from the law that there will be an incentive for
U.S. audit firms to move much of their operations abroad.397
In January 2003, the EU was initially pleased when the SEC announced
limited exemptions from new rules for accounting and corporate governance.
Included among the exemptions were (1) that foreign companies do not have to
disclose that a financial expert on the audit committee is independent of
management; (2) that non-management employees are allowed to serve on the
audit committee, a common practice in Germany- and (3) that foreign lawyers are
not required to report securities law violations within the firm, if they do not advise
management on issues of U.S. law. 398 However, by April 2003, the EU was less
pleased and was lobbying aggressively against any registration requrement. 39 9
Fritz Bolkenstem, the European commissioner in charge of market reform, wrote a
threatening letter to SEC Chairman William Donaldson, on behalf of the 15
member finance ministers, warning that such a requirement would undermine
confidence in financial markets and prompt reciprocal requirements for registration
of U.S. audit firms in each EU member country 400 The EU and European
governments are concerned that their audit firms not be subject to conflicting laws
and regulations and maintain that meeting U.S. disclosure requirements would
violate European data protection laws.4 0 ' They object to the law's coverage as
unfair, since European firms are already subject to a large number of U.S.
regulations. 4 2 The timing of the accounting fraud and restatement of over $800
million of earnings by Dutch food company Royal Ahold, however, stiffened the
resolve of the PAOB to cover the conduct of foreign auditors as well.
40 3
Jurisdiction over Overseas Firms and Auditors: When auditors working
abroad have evidence of accounting fraud, the question arises over U.S. access to
that information. When the Senate was investigating the BCCI (Bank of Credit
and Commerce International) scandal in 1991, Pncewaterhouse contended that
documents in its London office could not be subpoenaed, since the U.S.
headquarters had no control over its foreign branch offices. 404 The firm now says
it nevertheless regularly cooperates in supplying foreign work papers to the U.S.
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government.4 5 Foreign accounting firms must provide opinions and work papers,
upon which a registered public accounting firm relies when issuing an audit report
or anything that relates to its participation in an audit of a U.S. firm, though it does
not have to provide other unrelated documents.4 °6 The U.S. Customs Office will
also assist the SEC in tracking down documents by screening auditors when they
cross the border and denying them passage unless they turn over the documents.0
A KPMG auditor crossing the Mexican border turned over papers implicating
408Xerox Corporation in one such case, resulting in a $10 million settlement.
The SEC and federal prosecutors also have jurisdiction over overseas
companies based abroad that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and may
have engaged in fraud that harmed U.S. investors. On that basis, the SEC has
brought administrative proceedings against the Cronos Group, a Luxembourg
company headquartered in England, and against its British accountants, for an
alleged fraud in connection with an initial public offering in 1995.410 The SEC has
also asserted jurisdiction over the Ahold accounting investigation, since the
company is listed in the U.S.
411
Regulatory Bodies in Foreign Countries: In the U.S., the Justice Department
and the SEC usually work together to examine accounting and securities fraud.4t 2
Most other countries lack the kind of serious regulatory framework and
enforcement agencies that exist in the U.S. In the case of Royal Ahold's
accounting fraud, it is being investigated by three entities in the Netherlands - the
public prosecutor's office, the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets, and
Euronext Amsterdam NV the operator of the Dutch stock exchange.4i 3 However,
no Dutch regulatory authority enjoys the sweeping powers of the SEC, and
penalties for even such violations as insider trading are much milder than in the
U.S.
4 1 4
Having discussed both the voluntary changes in global corporate governance,
as well as some of the comparative regulations of corporate governance, the
following chart compares the ratings of corporate governance in leading European
countries.
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CONCLUSION
While U.S. Corporations have been under pressure to adopt more independent
boards since the 1970s, the corporate scandals and subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act
have added substantially to that pressure. Independence may be one factor among
several vital to reforming corporate governance, but it is certain that many
corporate boards are changing, especially in their scrutiny of CEOs and top
management. Business groups and leaders have criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
for going too far and adding needless expenses to conducting business, especially
in the standards and documentation of internal controls, while making it more
difficult to attract talented directors to govern the corporation. Meanwhile,
business critics contend the law falls short even in the area of accounting reform,
where it is most directed, and ignores other important areas of corporate
governance. Still, most acknowledge it is the most important corporate reform
legislation since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, and its impact is
bolstered by shareholder activism and litigation, by state and federal regulatory
authorities, by increased penalties and criminal prosecutions, and by more
aggressive stock exchanges.
The rise in concern over corporate governance is also occurring on a global
basis, taking on forms both similar to and different from those in the U.S. Some
countries take a stronger stakeholder approach than does the U.S., but shareholder
activism is becoming more common even in countries that do not share the
American history of capitalistic democracy. Further, in the U.K., governance
reform and shareholder empowerment has advanced in some ways even more than
it has in the U.S. Hopefully, this global movement will deter management
misconduct and elevate investor confidence in the future, thereby enhancing the
prospects for global economic expansion.
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